

JPRS 74463

29 October 1979

# Latin America Report

No. 2064

**FBIS**

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

#### NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

#### PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Indexes to this report (by keyword, author, personal names, title and series) are available from Bell & Howell, Old Mansfield Road, Wooster, Ohio 44691.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

<b>REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE</b>		<b>1. REPORT NO.</b> JPRS 74463	<b>2.</b>	<b>3. Recipient's Accession No.</b>
<b>4. Title and Subtitle</b> LATIN AMERICA REPORT, No. 2064			<b>5. Report Date</b> 29 October 1979	
<b>7. Author(s)</b>			<b>6.</b>	
<b>9. Performing Organization Name and Address</b> Joint Publications Research Service 1000 North Glebe Road Arlington, Virginia 22201			<b>8. Performing Organization Rept. No.</b>	
<b>12. Sponsoring Organization Name and Address</b>  As above			<b>10. Project/Task/Work Unit No.</b>	
			<b>11. Contract(C) or Grant(G) No.</b> (C) (G)	
			<b>13. Type of Report &amp; Period Covered</b>	
			<b>14.</b>	
<b>15. Supplementary Notes</b>				
<b>16. Abstract (Limit: 200 words)</b>  The serial report contains articles on political and sociological developments in major areas of Latin America, as reported primarily from Latin American newspapers and periodicals. It also includes information on major segments of Latin American economy, geography, culture, and ethnography.				
<b>17. Document Analysis &amp; Descriptors</b>				
Political Science	___ Inter-American Affairs	___ Haiti		
Sociology	___ Argentina	___ Honduras		
Economics	___ Barbados	___ Jamaica		
Culture	___ Bolivia	___ Mexico		
Ethnology	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Brazil	___ Netherlands		
Technological	___ Chile	___ Antilles		
Geography	___ Colombia	___ Nicaragua		
	___ Costa Rica	___ Panama		
	___ Cuba	___ Paraguay		
	___ Dominican Republic	___ Peru		
	___ Ecuador	___ Trinidad-Tobago		
	___ El Salvador	___ Uruguay		
	___ Guatemala	___ Venezuela		
	___ Guyana			
<b>b. Identifiers/Open Ended Terms</b>				
<b>c. COSATI Field/Group</b> 5D, 5C, 5K				
<b>18. Availability Statement</b> Unlimited Availability Sold by NTIS Springfield, Virginia 22161		<b>19. Security Class (This Report)</b> UNCLASSIFIED		<b>21. No. of Pages</b> 83
		<b>20. Security Class (This Page)</b> UNCLASSIFIED		<b>22. Price</b>

29 October 1979

## LATIN AMERICA REPORT

No. 2064

## CONTENTS

## PAGE

## BRAZIL

Figueiredo Reportedly on Verge of Major Electoral Decision (O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO, 11 Sep 79) .....	1
Single Party May Be Formed in Support of Government (O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO, 7 Sep 79) .....	4
General Abreu Expresses Support for Figueiredo's Policies (O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO, 12 Sep 79) .....	7
Congressional Leaders To Consider Amnesty, Party Reforms (O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO, 20 Aug 79) .....	9
President To Pardon Some Political Prisoners (O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO, 4 Sep 79) .....	14
Members of Underground Also Returning to Normalcy (VEJA, 5 Sep 79) .....	15
'VEJA' Interviews Sao Paulo's Security Chief (Octavio Gonzaga Junior Interview; VEJA, 29 Aug 79)...	18
'MANCHETE' Interviews Leonel Brizola (Leonel Brizola Interview; MANCHETE, 15 Sep 79) .....	25
PTB Intellectual Cavalcanti Interviewed by 'VEJA' (Pedro Celso Cavalcanti Interview; VEJA, 5 Sep 79) ...	32
Meaning of Brizola Return Analyzed by 'VEJA' (VEJA, 12 Sep 79) .....	39
'MANCHETE' Interviews Miguel Arraes (Miguel Arraes Interview; MANCHETE, 15 Sep 79) .....	45



CONTENTS (Continued)	Page
'LE MONDE' Interviews Governor Miguel Arraes (Dominique Dhombres Interview; LE MONDE, 16-17 Sep 79).	49
Authentic Faction of MDB Forms Bloc (ISTO E, 15 Aug 79) .....	52
Fifty Major Opposition Leaders Identified (VEJA, 5 Sep 79) .....	55
Future Role of Opposition Analyzed (VEJA, 5 Sep 79) .....	67
Strength of MDB in Various States Analyzed (VEJA, 12 Sep 79) .....	70
Current Shifts Within MDB Analyzed (O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO, 5, 6 Sep 79) .....	74
Groups Vie for Control Liberals, Guimaraes Clash	
MDB Hopes Brizola Could Unite Opposition Forces (O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO, 9 Sep 79) .....	79

FIGUEIREDO REPORTEDLY ON VERGE OF MAJOR ELECTORAL DECISION

Sao Paulo O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 11 Sep 79 p 2

[Article by C. C.]

[Text] On the subject of party reform, President Joao Figueiredo has already decided to abolish ARENA [National Renewal Alliance] and the MDB [Brazilian Democratic Movement] this year with a bill passed by the congressional majority that supports him. He is not likely to make his decision public before the end of the month, since he intends that the debate shall be as free and open as possible, while taking note of all the opinions and suggestions set forth by the several currents. The results of the inquiry made among the ARENA benches by Senator Jose Garney, officially delivered to the Planalto Palace yesterday, contributed to the president's arriving at this conclusion, but were not the only factor: according to an official source, the arguments and opinions expressed some time ago by ministers Petronio Portella and Golbery do Couto e Silva and by private secretary Heitor de Aquino would have carried equal weight.

Another presidential decision to be made soon is the one establishing that only one government party should be formed replacing ARENA. In spite of the reaction now being observed among many sectors on the government side against creating the so-called "ARENAO," General Figueiredo seems to believe, still according to palace spokesmen, that the theory of a single party in support of the government is the one that best takes into account the interests of the political opening. The remaining initiatives for reform would thus be guaranteed until the 1982 elections. They will not be thrown out by the change in the party framework, but will continue in the campaigns for next year's municipal elections, the return to direct elections of governors and the revision of the 1977 "package."

Up to this moment, and in spite of some ARENA pouting, and even in spite of the possibility that expectations may be reversed, the strategy of the justice minister, for whom the formation of two parties in support of the government constitutes an unnecessary risk to run and an innocuous measure, is winning all along the line. Petronio considers that the argument invoked to defend the two parties (a composition of the dissidences and situations to today's

ARENA in the various states) is getting nowhere and will not resolve anything. For him, if two parties are created, conflicting groups will come forth out of the belly of each, since the 1982 general elections, with the direct election of governors, will cause innumerable disputes. He considers those disputes useful and even necessary for the democratization of the nation, as those who arouse the most popular support will win. He adds, still according to his reasoning, that we are living in a hybrid time: democracy is on the march but it has not been fully achieved. Running the risk of having two parties would mean loosening the grasp of the absolute majority in the Congress that the government enjoys today and at least would oblige the president to make concessions and even deals for which the system is not yet ready. After the contest in 1982, and according to its results, it will be natural for a new arrangement to develop, no longer dictated by law but by the general tendencies in each group. On the other hand, a single party in support of the government might become even more consolidated. Everything depends on the behavior of the electorate, but in the meantime it is better not to impose solutions including artificial ones, solely for the purpose of solving the immediate problems of one state leader or another.

Party reform continues on its way. Consultations, soundings and negotiations, beginning this week, will move a little farther away from the situation with respect to the opposition. When it is definite that the parties are to be abolished and that the Planalto Palace will dispose of a single party label, the leaders of the government party will begin to intensify their contacts with the various groups in the MDB, especially the moderates. If the strategy is to maintain a united ARENA under another label, a new program and even diversified controls, a coalescing of opposing elements is also to be considered an official objective. The so-called Independent Party, to be formed by MDB moderates allied with a few ARENA dissidents, would further government policy. It is hoped, although reservedly, that Petronio Portella will talk very briefly with Thales Ramalho, Tancredo Neves and others. Furthermore, an understanding between the justice minister and certain labor sectors, even Leonel Brizola, is not out of the question. There is nothing concrete, obviously, and the senator from Piauí is not proposing anything, but if the ex-governor of Rio Grande do Sul shows interest a meeting can be arranged. As far as Deputy Ulysses Guimarães and the "authentic" group are concerned (the third slice of the bitter opposition loaf), no dialogs with the minister are anticipated. He will also be ready to discuss the situation if he is sought out, but he will not lift a finger to make it happen. As things are, their positions are already clearly defined and it would be uncomfortable to talk only to disagree more.

#### Complete Absorption

In spite of some reactions in Porto Alegre, brought to light on the day when the two dismissed councilmen were restored to their jobs, the so-called revolutionary system has been neatly and naturally absorbing the initial effects of the amnesty. The returning exiles, beginning with ex-Governor Leonel Brizola, have had their statements analyzed under vertiable magnifying glasses and microscopes. The same has occurred with their activities,

discreetly observed by the security forces, but up to now no one has even been cited as a result. It is not anticipated, except for the possibility of unusual occurrences, that the principal military leaders, beginning with the ministers, will make any new statements about the current state of the process of political opening. They have already stated what they have to state and everything can be summed up in the wish that Gen Walter Pires expressed to the returnees: that they "had had a pleasant trip."

#### Change of Labels

One month after Minister Delfim Netto took over SEPLAN the ministry can no longer be divided into three groups: the "developers," the "realists" and the "frustrated." The first of the three has won the battle, which ended with the dismissal of Mario Henrique Simonsen, the principal advocate of the realists, because he counted on the support of the frustrated. What is being attempted now is to make everyone the same. Delfim Netto, however, must be a realist, since there is still not enough money to put into effect all the projects requested by the various ministers. General Golbery do Couto e Silva, who used to be a realist too, has reached a meeting of the minds with Delfim. The two of them, as attested by persons close to both, are enjoying a veritable honeymoon, visiting each other's offices, separated only by thickness of a wall, innumerable times every day. It is believed in the Planalto Palace that President Figueiredo, 5 months before he took office, found the amalgam that would enable him to attempt the formation of a new group all his own. This would be different from the earlier situation, when some ministers were tagged as belonging to the Geisel government and others as belonging to the Medici government.

12116

CSO: 3001

SINGLE PARTY MAY BE FORMED IN SUPPORT OF GOVERNMENT

Sao Paulo O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 7 Sep 79 p 3

[Article by C. C.]

[Text] In spite of the sullenness of and complaints by some ARENA [National Renewal Alliance] congressmen and senators, the decision has been made, even though a formal announcement may be delayed for several weeks: there will be a single party supporting President Joao Figueiredo and the Revolution and it will be formed immediately after the dissolution of the present parties as part of the reforming of the parties.

This is Minister Petronio Portella's view, repeated to this reporter only yesterday. It is based on reasoning that we are living under a regime of transition and that the process of democratization, if it is to be completed, must not be endangered. Why should the government release the quiet and massive majority that it enjoys in the Congress when it can keep it, especially when it is essential for the approval of other measures that will follow as part of the political opening in the coming years?

Petronio Portella is surprised that some groups are now cropping up who are interested in seeing two groups in support of the Planalto Palace as a way to resolve impasses and regional conflicts. If up to now all supporters of the government have been able to live together and compose their differences within ARENA, why should those conditions suddenly disappear, especially if unity is the touchstone for the improvement of the regime? Furthermore, if we had two parties in support of the government, separating dissidents, we would immediately have people advocating three or even four parties. The proximity of the 1982 gubernatorial elections, which are to be direct, would immediately engender new divisions.

The justice minister, the principal official political spokesman, maintains that after the forthcoming legislative elections and with the country already having achieved new and important stages on the road to democratization, it will not be so vital for the government to have an absolute majority of more than 50 percent in Congress. Everything will depend on election results, on the freely expressed will of the electorate, but starting as of that moment, who can predict that the government party will not reach an understanding



with others? A coalition of forces with the goal of winning control over the process and especially of exercising power will be a natural consequence. That will be after 1982, however, not now.

Acting cautiously for the present, and intending that all kinds of ideas and proposals shall come out of the wide debate which is now taking place, he is at the same time not hesitant in specifying the three basic points of party reform: dissolution of the present parties, creation of a single government slate and abolition of the use of subordinate lists, at least on the federal and state levels. In this case, he emphasizes that the abolition of subordinate lists for senatorial and gubernatorial elections is a foregone conclusion. He is personally against them on the municipal level too, but if ARENA chooses by a majority vote to keep them, then the government will yield.

He believes, however, that once a multiparty system has been established with at least four parties, the municipal leaders will take an interest in their own advancement and that they will fill the vacancies and attempt to win a complete victory, no longer content to stay on the margin of their parties by using the subordinate lists. Those lists have been necessary under the two-party system and even more so as a function of the indirect elections in the states, since when the governors and their already-chosen successors visited the municipalities before the elections, they represented a fait accompli. There were no doubts in the minds of the municipal leaders that those two were in power and would continue to be so. When the reform now under way goes into effect, the top leaders will have to engage in a hand-to-hand struggle for the support of the municipal leaders, because they will be depending on them to elect their candidates for governor.

#### Formation of New Party

Petronio Portella has reacted sharply to the name given by the press, "ARENAO" [Super ARENA], to the new government party. He does not accept the pejorative connotation and declares that care is being taken to create an entirely new party. A new program, directed toward the social needs of the people and supporting the political opening, with many of its controls and structures renovated, and essentially a party which will not belong to the government but rather be part of the government. That realization will also constitute an important chapter in the political normalization, since the party's seats will receive an effective share in the government's decisions. Deputies and senators will be listened to, received by the ministers, and their pretensions--not physiological pretensions, of course, but those which correspond to their worth, their importance and their proposals--will be taken care of. In the same way they will be able to become members of the government in greater number than they do now, since the goal of President Joao Figueiredo is to normalize and enhance the political power of those who effectively represent the nation. Petronio Portella emphasizes that it is not a question of underhanded arrangements or deals, like some that have occurred in the past, when 13 parties evolved around the government's largesse. In this case it will be nothing more than the recognition of a de facto situation, inherent in democracies.

## New Constitution

Another prophecy by the justice minister is that after the 1982 elections, which will be direct and without preconditions, the government will sponsor a broad constitutional reform for the purpose of putting the present constitution in order and making it compatible with national needs. The crazy quilt into which the 1967 Constitution has been transformed needs to be redone, unified and brought up to date. The reform must follow the principle of including a body of general normative articles, allowing many questions now dealt with in the constitution to be left to ordinary law.

## Lost Opportunity

News has arrived from Porto Alegre to the effect that Governor Amaral de Souza is undergoing a serious personal and political crisis. To make a public impression, he wished to appear as having been able to impose his point of view on Brasilia; in other words, the case of the two councilmen who were recently rehabilitated will be heard by the Federal Supreme Court and not by the local courts. In the end, however, the successor of Sinval Guazzelli has been subjected to considerable wear and tear, since he was called to account, obliged to live up to his responsibilities and required to order his prosecutor general to officially communicate with the prosecutor general of the republic, so that the latter could petition the Supreme Court to hear the case. Amaral de Souza was trying to avoid the possible decline in popular support which could result from a new termination of Glenio Pares' and Marcos Klassman's official positions. However, there is no doubt that the highest court of justice in the nation will find that their terms of office were nullified by a revolutionary act in 1977 and therefore that their claims cannot be upheld by the court. It has become clear that the governor of Rio Grande do Sul, in spite of his twistings, turnings, back-trackings and other tricks, has wound up exactly where he should have been at the beginning: assuming his responsibilities, even if under duress.

12116

CSO: 3001

GENERAL ABREU EXPRESSES SUPPORT FOR FIGUEIREDO'S POLICIES

Sao Paulo O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 12 Sep 79 p 2

[Text] Gen Hugo Abreu, former chief of the military Household in the Geisel government, declared yesterday in Curitiba that the government of President Joao Figueiredo is carrying out an effective process of democratization in the country. He also guaranteed that this fact signifies the end of the revolutionary cycle begun in 1964. Although he admitted that "redemocratization is irreversible," Hugo Abreu did not choose to openly attribute it to President Figueiredo and limited himself to this explanation: "If they don't want me to criticize members of the government neither do I want to praise any of them."

Gen Hugo Abreu, although he recognized that "the political opening is one of the principal conquests of Brazilian public opinion," was rather cautious in his statements, refusing to comment on questions like one concerning the arrest of union leaders in Rio Grande do Sul or the warnings by military leaders which preceded the return of ex-Governor Leonel Brizola to the country.

The former chief of the Military Household went to Curitiba to make a speech to the students of the Catholic University of Parana. He took advantage of his visit by holding private meetings with several MDB [Brazilian Democratic Movement] deputies and with Domingo Laino, leader of the Authentic Radical Liberal Party of Paraguay. He also talked with Jose Carlos Mendes, the former political exile, who returned to Brazil last week.

In his speech on "the government's political performance," Gen Hugo Abreu accentuated that "the redemocratization of the country has always been the principal goal of the 1964 Revolution and it is now being fulfilled." That process, he declared, means that the Revolution now belongs to history and as a consequence it is finished "as a political and social event." Thus "there is nothing more to add and Brazil has to follow its own course."

The general considered "the return of the exiles to Brazil to be very natural" and avoided making any criticism of Leonel Brizola, the former governor of Rio Grande do Sul, as he emphasized: "My views are different from his, but I believe that the former governor suffered from being exiled before he

returned and it would be an act of cowardice to criticize him now. He will find it difficult for some time to interpret our reality and we have to try to understand him during this phase of his readaptation."

Hugo Abreu guaranteed that the current Brazilian crisis is essentially economic and social, although it is also political, "as a natural consequence of the redemocratization process, which is very delicate."

He proposed an alteration in the economic model as an alternative for the government. The model followed by the Revolution "is now played out and can no longer solve Brazil's problems." According to the general, that new model "must be devoted to the Brazilian people and exports must no longer be privileged," which will imply "a new social pact compatible with democracy."

Abreu again defended the extension of the amnesty to people involved in terrorism and to torturers, alleging that democratization has ended a phase of violence "which was very abnormal for the Brazilian people."

12116

CSO: 3001

# CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS TO CONSIDER AMNESTY, PARTY REFORMS

Sao Paulo O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 20 Aug 79 pp 18, 21-22

[Text] The dictionaries define "logomachy" as useless verbiage. At the beginning of August, when the National Congress reconvened, Deputy Ulysses Guimaraes, the president of the MDB [Brazilian Democratic Movement], disinterested the word to caustically refer to certain speculations that are fueling the national political debate today. Dr Ulysses' anger seemed to have been made especially acute by the conjectures on party reform. Surely, however, it was not just a rude outburst, a display of ill humor by an opposition president faced with the possibility of seeing his party wiped out in the wake of a government maneuver. Already in the first days of congressional activity in this second part of the session, several MDB politicians showed that they were taking care not to inflate the trial balloons released by the government with useless words.

The members of the two houses--not all of them, to tell the truth--have been complaining about the existence of a kind of "smoke screen," whose production would be encouraged by the government with the posing of false dilemmas and an official lack of precision with respect to the matters to be resolved--basically amnesty and party reform--by the political process.

"The government's tactics," Senator Pedro Simon (MDB, Rio Grande do Sul) declares, "are to do anything that will prolong the discussion. While that is going on, people don't talk about the Light scandal the stewardships, the economic policy, the internal debt, the service of the foreign debt which comes to \$7.5 billion, or about the transport minister, who, when he was in the DNER [National Highway Department], had his accounts rejected by the TCU [National Accounting Office]. If the question of the amnesty and that of the parties were resolved we would be discussing other topics--and that is something that the government is not interested in."

Senator Simon's declaration does not mean that the MDB is about to abandon the planned debate, whose purpose is to maintain the hegemony of the political power during the coming years without having to resort to the use of force. That plan, according to some distrustful politicians, would have approximately five stages, whose characteristics are probably already defined.



The first stage has already been accomplished: it was a question of moving up the party conventions scheduled for July. In the opinion of Federal Deputy Edgard Amorim (MDB, Minas Gerais) that action harmed only the MDB, since it impeded the mobilization of the opposition forces.

The second stage would be the granting of the amnesty. The idea of the government was to open the subject by sending the bill to the National Congress in such a way that it would keep the MDB busy for at least 40 days. How? By letting information leak to the press that it would not tolerate amendments widening the amnesty, that it would not accept modifications relative to the reintegration of disciplined government employees, etc. The second phase of that stage would come with the passage of the bill. As it would benefit punished politicians, the Planalto Palace would hope that the return of those men to public life would help divide the MDB. There are opposition senators and deputies who do not agree with this reasoning. According to them, even if the MDB were divided--with the return of the laborites or with the formation of other parties--the amnestied politicians would always be in opposition to the government. For that reason it would help to swell the opposition instead of shrinking it.

The third stage would be party reform. And here the idle chatter once again serves the designs of the Federal Government. There is speculation today on the essence of the complementary law which is to regulate the appearance of new parties--and chiefly on whether it will eliminate the present ones. And that discussion should keep the opposition busy for some time more. According to common knowledge--and President Joao Figueiredo himself is adding fuel to the fire--the Planalto Palace would be interested in promoting a party reform allowing him to have a super party that alone would have a majority in the two houses of Congress.

It happens that such an arrangement would be very difficult in view of the disagreements existing today inside ARENA [National Renewal Alliance]. To get around this little problem, government strategists have studied the possibility of maintaining subordinate lists. This would be foolish in a multi-party system but in practice it could facilitate the formation of a government party. Obviously, the MDB is already complaining about the subordinate lists--which does not mean that they will not be approved.

The fourth stage might be a postponement of the 1980 municipal elections, although there are some who admit that such a measure is not necessary to the government's plans. The new parties would have a hard time setting up central committees in all Brazilian municipalities in less than a year and competing with the government's administrative machinery, official bossism, etc.

The fifth stage would be to decree voting by districts. According to Senator Pedro Simon's calculations the government with a casuistical and clever division of districts, diminishing the representation of the great urban centers where the opposition is strongest, could keep its majority in Congress even if it had only 35 percent of the votes in the 1982 elections.

## Planalto's Orders

The existence of such a plan may appear too diabolical. It may even be that the Macchiavellianism is due to opposition paranoia. There is no way to deny, however, that the pieces are fitting together. Look at the case of the amnesty bill. One week after the joint committee was set up (11 federal deputies and 11 senators) with the task of examining the bill prepared by the government, 60 amendments had already been submitted. However, from the very first moment Deputy Ernani Satyro, the committee chairman designated by ARENA [National Renewal Alliance], declared that he would not accept modifications that would "make the amnesty unrestricted."

What will happen in a plenary session is more difficult to foresee. Senator Teotonio Vilela seems in some way to be counting on the support of some ARENA members in the final vote. He does not state this clearly, but he allows it to be understood when he refuses to make any prophecies on the possibility of broadening the amnesty: "Only the progress of the bill will show the form in which it will be approved. A lot can happen yet."

Among the first 60 amendments submitted, there are 4 substitute amendments under the authorship of opposition members Jose Costa, Marcos Freire, Alceu Collares and Orestes Quercia. All four grant a wide, general unrestricted amnesty (although Collares' amendment excludes torturers). At least 12 other amendments ask freedom for persons convicted of crimes against national security (kidnapping, robbery, etc.) who are currently in prison. For that purpose they suggest the deletion of Paragraph 2 of Article 1 of the government bill, which excludes convicted terrorists from the amnesty while granting pardons to perpetrators of similar crimes who have not been tried.

One of the most experienced jurists in Congress, Deputy Djalma Marinho (ARENA, Rio Grande do Norte), chairman of the Constitution and Justice Committee of the Chamber of Deputies, has reservations about the discrimination contained in the government bill.

"In the first place," Marinho argues, "by law the only unequal treatment is a function of age. Next, the amnesty always refers to crimes, not to persons. To amnesty is to consider the crimes as nonexistent, and for that reason too the bill should not discriminate." Up to 2 days before the end of the period allowed for the submission of amendments, at least 25 changes to the government bill had been proposed in regard to the return of punished government employees. As far as is known, the government would be disposed to compromise on that point, permitting the rehabilitation of discharged employees without the necessity of a formal inquiry into the employee's case. However, it would not accept automatic reintegration, subjecting the return of an employee to the conditions of "the existence of a vacancy" and whether it is "in the interest of authority." The MDB amendments seek automatic reintegration, to include the time unemployed in calculating retirement and eliminate the condition of "the interest of authority." Deputy Edson Vidigal (ARENA, Maranhao) has presented an amendment to the effect that reintegration not be conditioned by the nihil obstat of the organs of information.

There are amendments to change the period to which the amnesty will refer. Some try to move the date back to 1952 in order to include the military personnel who took part in the "The petroleum is ours" campaign and who still have not been pardoned. Other amendments aim at extending the benefits of the amnesty to the date on which the law was published (the government's bill limits the bill to crimes committed before 31 December 1978). There are two amendments asking amnesty for the students punished under Decree-Law 477 and one amendment aiming at restoring political and voting rights to labor leaders dismissed for political reasons, including the right to be union leaders again. However, it was the fate of Deputy Rosenburgo Romano (MDB, Minas Gerais) to have the glory of presenting an absolutely original amendment, whose essence is as follows: "The memory of Juscelino Kubitschek de Oliveira is expressly rehabilitated."

Neither Government nor MDB

After the amnesty comes the party reform. According to the information available during the first days after Congress reconvened, the shape of the new structure will probably not be under the control of either the government or the MDB. The government wanted to guarantee itself a majority in both houses of Congress with the formation of a single party, dividing the MDB in the following way: the laborites and the "authentic" would go to the PTB [Brazilian Labor Party] or would form two small parties and the moderates would be grouped in the "independent party." The MDB, on the other hand, wanted to remain as a unit and even attract some ARENA members. They were counting on a division within ARENA caused by the formation of the "independent party."

With the first movements toward party reform, the picture that emerges does not resemble the hopes of either the government or of the MDB. A group of opposition members has already formed a labor contingent. Others, of the "authentic" group, who are not disposed to join ex-Governor Leonel Brizola's PTB, have already met several times to form a group guided by what they call "the spirit of Sao Bernardo," in reference to a meeting of MDB members with union leaders held some months ago in Sao Bernardo, Sao Paulo. The first meeting of this group was attended by 53 members of Congress. Its practical result was to elect a committee composed of seven members (Ailton Soares, Edgard Amorim, Aurelio Peres, Fernando Lyra, Cristina Tavares, Alceu Collares and Euclides Scalco). That committee will consider a plan of action for the group. It is known that among the ideas of the "Sao Bernardo group" is the idea that the MDB should continue. And that if the party is eliminated, whether by force applied by the government or by a congressional majority, the group will seek to form "a people's party, devoted to the elimination of misery, the distribution of income and nationalistic planning."

Federal Deputy Magalhaes Pinto (ARENA, Minas Gerais) is continuing to put together a party whose name, provisionally, is the Independent Democratic Party [PDI]--"to keep people from calling it Magalhaes' party," he explains; but he refuses to tell the names of his future companions.

According to Magalhaes, the PDI "will be a party turned toward the future, concerned about young people and women." And, although he admits that the party is not completely ready, as it is still receiving suggestions from its members, he declares that it will be "broad, open to workers, democratic and nationalistic." Deputy Magalhaes Pinto also believes that the PDI should defend Brazilian private enterprise, above all small and medium enterprise, since "large enterprise does not need any special protection." However, he does not believe that the multinationals should have "absolute freedom" because "it would be prejudicial to Brazil and dangerous to our sovereignty. The multinationals should have a special law to restrain their fields of activity. We need to define the sectors in which multinational capital should be channeled. And the indiscriminate purchase of national enterprises by multinationals is prejudicial."

Will the Independent Democratic Party serve the government? Perhaps. Deputy Magalhaes Pinto insists that his group will be "independent." And that he is not "obstinately against," although he may not be in favor, either. Will the PDI ally itself with the PTB, for example, in the opposition? "To be in the opposition," Magalhaes answers, "you don't need to make alliances." This is an answer which, like others, does not allow one to judge whether the PDI will help to form a government majority or not.

12116

CSO: 3001



# PRESIDENT TO PARDON SOME POLITICAL PRISONERS

Sao Paulo O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 4 Sep 79 p 12

[Text] This month or next the president of the republic will send down "an act of pardon" which will benefit all political prisoners not reached by the amnesty, according to information received yesterday, in Brasilia, from sources in the Superior Military Court [STM].

The pardon will reduce the sentences of the prisoners to the point where they can receive conditional liberty. Thus, if a prisoner has 10 years remaining to serve, his sentence will be reduced to 5 years--a sentence which, when added to the time he has already served, will allow him to leave prison. According to the sources in the STM, after the pardon no political prisoner will remain in prison.

## Banishment Revoked

In Rio, the First Judgeship of the Army has decreed the extinction of culpability for 16 formerly banished persons who were tried there. This pardon has liberated Ricardo Villas Boas de Sa Rego, Mario Augusta Carneiro Ribeiro, Fausto Machado Freire, Marco Antonio de Azevedo Meyer, Cid Queiros Benjamin (involved in three cases), Daniel Aarao Reis Filho, Jose Duarte dos Santos, Pedro Franca Viegas, Fernando Gabeira, Almir Dutton Ferreira, Carmella Pezzutti, Liszt Benjamin Vieira, Eudaldo Gomes da Silva and Carlos Bernardo Wainer. The cases of these person had been reopened after the act of banishment was revoked.

## Orders Revoked

In Sao Paulo the First Judgeship has ordered the revocation of the orders imprisoning Carlos de Angeli, Angela Maria Mendes de Almeida, Helena Sumiko Hirata, Flavio Koutz, Anita Leocadia Prestes, Antonio Chamorro, Edgard da Silva, Glaucio da Rocha Trota, Jose Panequi, Lindolfo Silva, Dinarco Reis, Jair Ferreira de Sa, Maria de Fatima Azevedo, Pedro Pereira do Nascimento, Jose Renato Rabello, Paulo Stuart Wright, Celia Maria Medeiros da Rocha Paes, Dineas Fernandes de Aguiar, Manoel Geraldo Cacao Pereira, Mauricio Grabois, Joao Amazonas de Souza Pedroso, Jony da Silva Ribeiro, Manoel Jover Telles, Ronaldo Cavalcanti de Freitas, Pericles Santos de Souza, Armando Teixeira Frutuoso, Ramiro de Deus Bonifacio, Denise Peres Crispim and Altino Rodrigues Dantas Junior. All of them are defaulters.



## MEMBERS OF UNDERGROUND ALSO RETURNING TO NORMALCY

Sao Paulo VEJA in Portuguese 5 Sep 79 pp 23-24

[Text] In addition to the political prisoners and the exiles, the amnesty law has also begun to reduce the incalculable contingent of Brazilians who remained in the country or returned to it to live underground. Last week, even before seeing their names on any list of amnestied persons, two persons tried for subversive activities emerged from their hideouts and resumed legal lives in Rio de Janeiro. On Wednesday, former student leader Carlos Alberto Muniz spoke to the press in the office of the MDB state deputy, Raimundo do Oliveira. On the following day Aluizio Ferreira Palmar, formerly exiled, made telephone contact with the Rio de Janeiro branch of VEJA.

Muniz is today an electrical engineer, 35 years old, married and father of two small children--Pedro, 6 years old, born in Chile, and Andre, 4, born in France. Sentenced to 7 years in prison for his activity as a student leader, he lived underground from 1968 to 1970 before he went into exile first in Chile and then in France. In 1977 he returned to Brazil for a period of almost 3 years of illegal life. Palmar, 36 years old, lives in Niteroi with his wife and three children. He has lived there since last June, when he made a clandestine entry into the country. Included in the group of 60 political prisoners exchanged by Swiss Ambassador Giovanni Enrico Bucher, kidnapped in December 1970, his name was cited several times as one of those who had disappeared or died in confrontations with the forces of repression. In reality, Palmar had moved to Peru from Chile, to which country he had been banished, in 1973. In Peru he lived incognito and underground until 3 months ago.

## Dangerous Element

"My decision to return and live underground was a personal decision," Muniz declared last Wednesday as he signed an MDB membership card, now in at least moral possession of all his rights as an amnestied citizen. Avoiding greater details about his life in Rio de Janeiro--or anyplace else--for the last 3 years, the new member of the opposition only made it clear that living underground did not keep him from doing some political work.

For some time Muniz was considered an extremely dangerous element by the security forces. An orator respected in student circles, he left the presidency of the Central Directorate of the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro to take the place of Vladimir Palmeira in the leadership of UME [Metropolitan Union of Students], a job that he performed underground for more than 1 year, after AI-5 [Institutional Act No 5] was decreed. When Carlos Lamarca was killed in the interior of Bahia in September 1971, Muniz had his photograph printed on thousands of "wanted" posters, which the police were distributing at the time. He was considered a dangerous terrorist. More than that, he was among those considered able to replace the ex-army captain in the command of terrorism in Brazil. In 1971 MR-8 [8 October Revolutionary Movement] decided that he should leave the country for security reasons.

Today, older and more experienced, Muniz is in favor of Brizola's return but against the PTB [Brazilian Labor Party]. Instead of weapons he advocates strengthening the MDB as a party, without any kind of division unless it is the exclusion of the "Adesistas."

#### Shock of Return

Having spent much less time underground, Aluizio Palmar seemed more insecure last Friday. He is afraid of not being included among the amnestied--although beneficiaries do not exist--and he has still not absorbed the shock of returning. "It is worse than the insecurity that banishment gives you," he declared. "When you are banished to all intents and purposes it's the same as not existing any more, you can die and no one will know it. That's why I isolated myself so much in Peru. The shock now is in leaving the underground and living legally, being able to show documents during a police raid, assuming my own identity and having an established home. Even giving interviews."

Involved in politics since he was 18 years old, Palmar joined the PTB at the time when Roberto Silveira was governor of the State of Rio de Janeiro. Later he joined the PCB [Brazilian Communist Party], with which he would progressively come to disagree. In 1968 he joined the student dissidence which organized MR-8. Fascinated by the theoretical teaching about scattered guerrilla foci in the book "Revolution Within the Revolution?" by the French writer Regis Debray, a friend of Ernesto "Che" Guevara in the guerrilla war in Bolivia, the little group of students from the State of Rio de Janeiro resolved to put their learning into practice. "Everything was in the book. All we had to do was copy it," Palmar recalls today with a smile.

It was a disaster. Sent with four other militants to southwestern Parana, where he was supposed to set up the first guerrilla focus, he did not even go into action. On 9 April 1969 Palmar drove the organization's jeep into an automobile in the middle of the city of Cascavel, near the highway police station. He and the four other candidates for guerrilla warfare had memorized some maps and subversive propaganda. They all ended up in prison, tried in company with other members of the MR-8 connected with the activities of the ex-bank employee Jorge Medeiros Vale, "the good bourgeois."

## Insecurity in Exile

Sentenced to 6 years, Palmar was banished to Chile in January 1971, where he stayed until the fall of Salvador Allende in September 1973. He was in Tacna, in the north of the country. "To return to Santiago would be madness," he recalls. "I resolved to escape to Peru. Those were very difficult times. I did all kinds of odd jobs and my isolation pained me a great deal." At first he didn't have any contact with anyone, not even his family, who moved in part from Foz do Iguacu--his wife and the older daughter. In 1976 his wife followed him to Lima. In his insecurity, Palmar continued doing odd jobs without any steady connection, and he was afraid of being expelled from the country.

He did not learn in Peru that he had been given up for dead. His family members in Brazil refused to enter into greater details when entities connected with the amnesty asked questions about his location. At the beginning of this year, the Brazilian Committee for Amnesty, in Bahia, sent a letter to his kindred in Rio, telling them the case of a dead person who apparently had Palmar's physical characteristics. Because precise information was lacking, his name was not included on any official list of dead or missing persons--only the newspapers sporadically mentioned such possibilities.

Finally last June, when he learned that the government had sent an amnesty bill to Congress, he decided to return to his country illegally. With his family, he moved to Niteroi while he waited for the approval of the bill and its signing by the president of the republic.

Still a little insecure and frightened, Palmar has no definite plans. He does not know to what work he wants to devote himself, since he abandoned his social science course to take up the armed struggle. Unlike Muniz, he has no definite political plans. He approves supporting the MDB although he does not plan to join the party. He did not seem to be at ease even during his meeting with the VEJA reporter. "I have only answered questions when being interrogated," he remarked. "I have still not gotten used to giving an interview."

12116

CSO: 3001

'VEJA' INTERVIEWS SAO PAULO'S SECURITY CHIEF

Sao Paulo VEJA in Portuguese 29 Aug 79 pp 3, 4, 6

[Interview with Sao Paulo Public Security Secretary Octavio Gonzaga Junior]

[Text] Appointed secretary of public security of Sao Paulo 5 months ago, retired appeals court Judge Octavio Gonzaga Junior, who put an end to the tradition that assigned the post exclusively to a military man, has been garnering successes in an area where the majority of his colleagues in other states fear to tread. He discreetly headed a reshuffle that removed from their entrenched positions police chiefs whose names had been connected for some time with stories of violence and corruption. Firmly but calmly, he weathered unscathed the most acute period of strikes in recent years. A few days ago, in another unprecedented act, he called a press conference to report that Homero Lopes, "Chachrinha," had not committed suicide in a cell in the 46th District in Perus, as was first reported. Homero had been tortured to death by police, whose names were revealed on the secretary's orders.

Sixty-five years old, father of two children, Gonzaga retains some of the habits acquired during his time as judge in cities in the interior of Sao Paulo, such as wearing dark jackets and vests or keeping his now white hair impeccably combed back, in addition to his willingness to punish criminals even if they belong to the police staffs. "Almost fascinated" by the position, above all by the prospect of improving the image of the Sao Paulo police, he spends his long 15-hour workday ensconced in his well-appointed office in the district of Higienopolis in the center of Sao Paulo, where he granted VEJA the following interview:

The Death Certificate Had Disappeared

Question: A few days ago, President Figueiredo said he feels powerless to compel the verification of cases of violence that involve the police. But you promise to put an end to torture of common prisoners....

Answer: I believe the president meant to say that there are difficulties, and they really do exist. But I do not feel powerless to verify those cases.

Question: What sort of difficulty?



Answer: Cases of violence against prisoners, for example, are generally known to a limited number of people, all of them belonging to the circle of those involved. That circumstance makes it difficult but it does not impede verification of the truth. But we are going to clarify every case that arises.

Question: You reject the argument that the police are incapable of investigating themselves?

Answer: At least as far as Sao Paulo is concerned, the argument is absolutely false. The case of Homero Lopes, who died in the 46th District, in Perus, is a striking example of what I am saying. The crime was committed by police and it is the police who are investigating and clarifying everything.

Question: But it is also true that at the beginning of the case, the Secretariat of Public Security issued a communique stating that Homero had committed suicide.

Answer: That is true. I had received a communication from the chief of the 46th District—who has already been removed—with the results of an inquest, according to which Homero Lopes, known as "Charinha," had killed himself with his shirt in a cell. The story was based on depositions from the jailer, the investigators and a guard, the latter also removed. Wanting to anticipate the press, the communications service of the secretariat issued a communique reporting that a suicide by hanging had occurred in the 46th District. Later, examining the inquest I did not see any death certificate. I sent for it, and there it was: the cause of death was unknown. That caught my attention because hanging leaves marks around the neck. I ordered an autopsy to determine the real cause of death and the truth came out: there was no suicide; there was no hanging. The autopsy also indicated blows to the head, lesions on the brain, candle burns. I became furious. First, because I had been deceived by the inquest. Second, because one cannot imagine a thing of that sort. I called a press conference and told the truth.

Question: After that incident, wasn't there any resistance, any new attempt at a coverup?

Answer: None! None! Not even on the part of those directly implicated. Of course, they are trying to defend themselves, but that is human.

#### The Torturers Are Degenerates

Question: At what stage is the investigation of the case?

Answer: We have the names of all those involved. One of them, Military Policeman Paulo Camargo, described in detail the torture suffered by Homero, naming the other participants. Police Chief Rubens Liberatori, who is following the inquest, is completing his report. He promised me that with a few more days' work, he would have ample proof. Later the findings of the inquest will be forwarded to the courts and the problem will be out of my hands. I believe the courts will punish all the guilty. By humanistic constitution, I am fiercely against torture. I consider torturers to be subhuman, outlaws, degenerates.



Question: Some victims of torture relate that certain torturers acted as if they were performing some sort of bureaucratic task. Some of them interrupted torture sessions to talk to their wives on the telephone and ask about the children, and then returned to their job. Isn't that a sign that those officials practice torture like a routine job?

Answer: I believe that is another sign that we are dealing with mentally defective people. In the little room where they did all that to Homero, there was a placard with the phrase: "Place of Happy People." They are degenerates.

Question: Do you concede that up to now the torture of common prisoners has been an institutionalized practice by the police?

Answer: With rare exceptions, there is always violence in any police force in the world. I am referring, of course, to relative violence: squeezing the arm, even a punch. Let us agree that you cannot handle criminals with kid gloves. But I do not believe that the practice of beating has been institutionalized. There are cases, of course; there have always been. But it is not a matter of institutionalization. In Sao Paulo, only a small proportion of the police resort to such methods.

Question: There is a saying that has circulated for many years among investigators of crimes against property: "A crook only talks under a cudgel."

Answer: I guarantee that that is not so, although there are always excesses and abuses. Besides, recourse to violence does not resolve anything. Lately, almost all judges do not attach the least merit to a confession obtained by the police because those indicated always allege that they confessed under torture. That is very bad for determining the truth because it ends up benefiting the guilty who confessed to crimes they have actually committed. But the judges do not believe those confessions obtained during the police phase.

Question: When Chief Jose Vidal Fernandes replaced the deceased Chief Sergio Fleury as head of the State Department of Criminal Investigation (DEIC), which covers the section of crimes against property, he had to face the hostility of police who opposed his scientific methods of investigation, arguing that no robbery would be solved without violence.

Answer: That was resolved in 10 days. Dr Vidal Fernandes is a great chief, who carries out interrogations as they should be carried out, without violence. Of course, he encountered resistance from persons accustomed to another type of chief. Some recalcitrants were removed and the problem has been solved.

Question: In the meantime, the police say that you are preparing to "make impromptu visits" to the precincts. If that is true, then things are not entirely resolved in that area.

Answer: The Secretariat of Public Security is extremely busy; I do not have any time. Every day there is a strike here, a political meeting there, a demonstration for amnesty elsewhere, and I have to keep abreast, examining the situation, taking precautions. But pretty soon I am going to begin to make daily runs, which we call "impromptus," to all the precincts. I want to know who is under arrest there, talk to the prisoners, find out why they are there and how they are being treated. No investigator who is a member of that gang of misfits--which, I repeat, are not many--will have the nerve to do anything of the sort knowing that the secretary of security may suddenly come barging in there.

#### Without Money At Stake, There Is No Corruption

Question: Why do you not order the seizure of the instruments of torture?

Answer: Because I cannot find them; I have never found them. If I catch a cudgel in any precinct, I will turn that precinct inside out. But those instruments do not appear easily. Look, one of those involved in the death of Homero Lopes carried his little shock machine in a 007-type attache case.

Question: Until recently, the public seemed to attach little importance to violence against common prisoners, considering it one of the inevitable, distasteful things of life in a society. Has that situation changed now?

Answer: Yes. With the political opening, the problem of the torture of political prisoners disappeared and society began to become concerned about a question--violence against common prisoners--which until then had been relegated to a secondary level. But I believe that that concern has always existed, although with less intensity. I admit that some people--especially those who have already been held up, shot, or who have had any type of contact with thugs--believe that every guilty person should be forced to confess, even if under torture. It is a defensive reaction. But normal men are against that violence.

Answer: Are the Sao Paulo police equipped to solve crimes using scientific methods exclusively?

Answer: I would not say that it is completely equipped. But it has the means to investigate without violence. When they want to work, the Sao Paulo police are extremely competent.

Question: Is violence the main problem you encountered in the police force?

Answer: It is one of the two main problems. The other is corruption.

Question: How are you combatting corruption?

Answer: The police proved to be corrupt are being removed. I cannot yet cite their names, but I guarantee that they are being removed. In addition, whenever I feel that a policeman can be corrupted, I remove him from a place where

there may be corruption and send him to sections where that is impossible. Such is the case of the sector that deals with minors, or disorderly conduct, or vagrancy. There, where there is no money at stake, there is no corruption.

#### A New Antistrike Philosophy

Question: And who is going to replace those who have been reshuffled?

Answer: Police who are absolutely incorruptible. I have people like that in the traffic department (Detran), a center of corruption. Or in Degran [expansion unknown], another section that requires care. Some time ago, the father of a young drug addict arrested by Degran went to take two blankets to his son and was offered the release of his son in exchange for 200,000 cruzeiros. I have to combat those things. The problem of corruption is very sensitive and requires more time to be resolved. It is not easy to get proof. It is very difficult, for example, to catch an action shot of somebody giving money to a policeman.

Question: There is a theory that the low wages paid to policemen are a powerful incentive for corruption. Do you agree?

Answer: Obviously. After the recent increases, the chiefs are being paid very well--at present the Sao Paulo police chiefs earn 33,000 to 100,000 cruzeiros per month. Detectives earn an average of 11,000 cruzeiros per month. But the police need to earn more. It is not possible for a detective to continue to earn 9,000 cruzeiros per month.

Question: In other states, the civil police have gone on "slowdown strikes," reducing their activity to a minimum to demand higher salaries. Can that sort of thing also happen in Sao Paulo?

Answer: As far as the chiefs are concerned, I do not believe so; they are getting good salaries. As for the other categories, I do not think so either. Because they are patient. And they all know that strikes do not resolve anything. Furthermore, if they should occur, I would kick the strikers out and get replacements for them.

Question: You have been easier with regard to strikes outside the police.

Answer: As long as a strike does not degenerate into a row, does not give way to disorders and attacks against property, I allow strikers to meet. The constitution guarantees that right.

Question: Even if pickets appear?

Answer: Sometimes the pickets must be dispersed. But I have not had to do even that. I believe that the government of Sao Paulo has given the country an example of how to cope with strikes.

Question: But you were accused of having resorted to violence during the ABC metalworkers' strike in March of this year?

Answer: I found myself occupied with that strike as soon as I assumed the secretariat. It was a serious movement, well directed, headed by enlightened organizations in terms of the meaning of a strike. But on the first day, strikers went about breaking Sao Paulo Telecommunications Company (TELESP) phone booths, stoning show windows, causing disorder. Since things got out of hand and I had not received authorization to offer the Sao Bernardo Stadium to the strikers, I was forced to intervene forcefully. That is, with the military police, with arrests, with, let us say, relative violence. In my administration, it was the first, only and last time that I acted that way. The press screamed, saying that strikes are the consequence of the political opening process and that democracy must support them. I restudied the matter well and adopted a new philosophy, which I have followed until now.

Question: What does that new antistrike philosophy consist of?

Answer: To observe and avoid confrontation. I recommended to the commander of the military police that he abstain completely from any repressive measure as long as there is no disturbance. The civil police, which is more capable and is not uniformed, remains observing. And the military police troops remain in readiness without making an appearance. If necessary, they will appear in minutes. That philosophy is valid not only for strikes but for any demonstration.

Question: Are you satisfied with the results?

Answer: Yes, I am. Look, my bill of fare has been extremely full: every day there is some political meeting in Sao Paulo, when some occupational sector is not on strike. No secretary of security caught it like I did on assuming office. None of them. When I took office, I assumed nine strikes at the outset, sometimes at the same time. Nine! There were strikes in two sectors--transportation and trash collection--that paralyzed a city. All were resolved without gunfire or killing. We have not had street riots or disorders. A short time ago, the bank workers held a march in the center of Sao Paulo which had the unprecedented participation of traffic policemen; the policemen collaborated in insuring that the demonstration went well, detouring vehicles from the streets where the march would pass. Look at what a nice thing that was.

#### In Sao Paulo 49 Holdups a Day

Question: From what we can see, you have been quite occupied with combatting violence and corruption and with the period of strikes and demonstrations. Is there time to try to reduce the crime rate?

Answer: It is difficult to believe, but the crime rates are declining. Holdups are a good thermometer. In April they reached their peak in recent months: 65 holdups per day in Greater Sao Paulo. In May, that rate dropped

to 58 per day, reaching 55 in June. The last survey I have on hand pertains to July: 49 holdups per day. I attribute that drop to the expanded visibility of the police. The police are in the streets to prevent. It is unfortunate that I do not have the manpower I would like to have, to spread the police out in every block in Greater Sao Paulo.

8711

CSO: 3001



'MANCHETE' INTERVIEWS LEONEL BRIZOLA

Rio de Janeiro MANCHETE in Portuguese 15 Sep 79 pp 11-14

[Interview with former governor of Rio Grande do Sul Leonel Brizola in New York, date not given]

[Text] Question: Could you summarize those 15 years of exile?

Answer: When events transpired in 1964, I was in Porto Alegre set to travel to Rio, and when I heard one of the last speeches President Goulart made at a ceremony, I believed that he was in a very strong position. At the insistence of my comrades there in Porto Alegre and even of many military men, I decided not to leave at that time. But I was always left with the impression that if I had gone to Rio, I would have carried out activities of such a nature that the events possibly would have changed course. But when we felt that the coup had really begun, we all sought to contribute to insuring that public order would not be disturbed too much, especially because we already perceived that it was useless resistance. I was one of those who decided to await events, and went to rest in the home of a friend outside the city. When repression began, I had to go underground, remaining in that status for about 2 months. A little later I would join President Goulart and my family, who had already taken asylum in Uruguay. We remained there for 13 years. The first years were years of active plotting against the Brazilian regime. We conspired for a period of 2 and a half years but unfortunately nothing we planned worked out due to lack of experience, of environment, of knowledge, of means and also because the regime consolidated itself more and more every day. After we decided to stop what would be a useless sacrifice, we sought to sell our properties in Brazil and organized a small agricultural-livestock complex in the interior of Uruguay. Police surveillance was tight and I went to the countryside only when accompanied by a police agent. Finally, after 7 years, the Brazilian Government asked that the restriction be suspended, and by that time we were living practically in the interior, engaged in mechanized agriculture and mainly raising sheep, until September 1977. This period in the countryside was one of great reflection and such meditation. I believe that as regards the view of society, I derived much more out of meditation than out of studying or reading. It was an especially tranquil and useful period because only after working in that environment for a long time did I succeed in regaining my emotional balance. I had always felt greatly offended. All of my reaction and my rejection of what they had done was more a question of honor than ideology.

I am obviously suspect to defend myself but there are many assessments about me that do not correspond to the facts. I cite for example, the comments made by David Nasser, in the magazine MANCHETE. Of course, he has every right to make them because that is his view. But basically it is bad reporting because I was never active in national politics except in a broad sense. My activity was in Rio Grande do Sul and I am known there. The ones who are really in a position to judge me are the people of Rio Grande do Sul. I do not want to say that I have not committed errors and that I do not have my defects, but always full of good faith.

After all, in these recent years of exile in Uruguay I had contact only with people of my state, which enabled me to keep the political base alive. Thus I was when that untimely decision came, which I imagine was the result of the differences between Geisel and Frota, and one of the two sides asked the Uruguayan Government that I be removed from there. From what I learned later, there had been an agreement on the part of the Brazilian authorities, who believed it was necessary for me to be removed because Brazil was going to have internal problems and they certainly were concerned that at a moment of crisis I might intervene in Rio Grande do Sul; and in that agreement with the Uruguayan Government they added the following: if you cannot provide a solution, let the Uruguayan Government close its eyes because we will. In a certain way that is consistent with the explanation I received there, that the measure was to save my life. The fact is that I left there and we arrived here in New York on 21 September 1977. Since that time I have tried to absorb the new context. This view of mine of international relationship I already held embryonically there, in Uruguay, because even with the sketchy news, I had already arrived at some conclusions in that regard. In these last 2 years, I succeeded in developing that relationship with U.S. and especially European liberal circles. At the invitation of the Labor Party of the Netherlands and of the Chilean Radical Party, I attended the First Social Democratic Congress in Hamburg and got to know many of the Social Democratic leaders. I was with Willy Brandt, whom I had met 20 years before when I had already become concerned about those two centers of power--the Soviet and American--to which we had to subordinate ourselves. I called for a return to our relationship with Europe because that is where all our roots lie, a whole historic link with which we could find another source of identity. Twenty years later, I believe that I carried out good work and that it will be extremely useful for Brazil. I believe that those progressive areas of European and the U.S. liberal circles represent the best that we can establish in the area of international relations. It was a task that I carried out at great sacrifice, like an artisan, without secretaries, without aides. It is true that I met many comrades and friends who were extremely cooperative, but it was always a contingent support.

Question: Coming back to the initial 2 and a half years of exile, what do you say about the CIA document to the effect that you had an agreement with Cuba?

Answer: At the opportune time, I intend to make a public report about all those activities we carried out in Uruguay.

Question: Was there money?

Answer: I prefer to reply the way I was framing the answer. I have made it my policy not to refer to many aspects of our activity in Uruguay, except on the basis of generalities because I believe they are wounds that are healing and that are not worth reopening. But I would say right now that with regard to that agreement, that the aforementioned CIA report is very far from the truth. There was no agreement with the Cubans or with Mr Fidel Castro. There were contacts and the one who made those contacts was a very responsible comrade of mine, with my authorization, whose name we will reveal at the opportune time. Initially, it was humanitarian aid. Later, there was some aid with a political interest. There were people who went to Cuba for training and I was one of those who concurred fully that they go. But that did not last long because we immediately ascertained the impracticability of those understandings with the Cubans and we decided to cut them off. Now, the fact that we should have undertaken those understandings with the Cubans or received arms and money to wage war, confronting the violence and brutal repression of a regime of force against a disarmed people, should not surprise anybody. At that time, if the devil had appeared to us with cloven hooves and was prepared to fight, we would have ordered him to "fall in." Much worse was American aid to a whole army that was exercising indiscriminate violence against its own disarmed people, and with the CIA working together with it. That was worse than we, half a dozen "guys" trying to cope with a situation that we could not cope with. But just the same, it did not last long because we ascertained the impracticability of it in view of our principles.

Question: Principles that remain to this day?

Answer: Principles that are part of us. And from that point on, we never again had contacts of any kind.

Question: How did you receive approval of the amnesty plan?

Answer: The recently secured amnesty brought great joy to all of us who can return to Brazil and all whose rights of citizenship have been restored. But it also brought much sadness because in returning we are leaving outside here many Brazilians who should also be returning. Even there in the country, there are prisoners who continue to serve unjust and arbitrary sentences. But there is no doubt that that decision was a positive step in the direction of democratization of Brazilian life because rather than benefiting a minority of some Brazilians vis-a-vis the whole community, amnesty is a political gain of the Brazilian people. We regret that the amnesty has been partial and restricted. But I am certain that from now on the demands of the Brazilian public to make that amnesty complete will be intensified. What our people most desire is to supersede that phase. They do not even care about revanchism because essentially they are going through their own afflictions and difficulties. The people do not even understand how it is that all those people who are there at the top do not decide those problems once and for all: amnesty, revocation of the Falcão Law. Don't you think our people would like to see their political representatives speak on television? And that the

country could appear abroad as a democratized nation, with a constitution? That it could organize, petition and fully discuss every type of problem through democratic processes that do not depend on the good will of this one or that one? And above all, to widely discuss every sort of privilege that has been granted? For that reason, I believe that amnesty should be broad and complete so that we can move on to another decision, and another and another, and yet another, until our people feel the fullness of their sovereignty.

#### Nostalgic Connotation In the Return to Brazil

Question: Why that nostalgic connotation in that return of yours through the city of Sao Borja?

Answer: Our return through Sao Borja, in the first place responds to a wish on the part of Neusa and I recognize her full right to do so. She has accompanied me all those years, living with me through every sort of problem and sacrifice. She has been an inseparable companion and, therefore, has every right to select the point where we should enter Brazil. And that view is now also shared by me. Our dead, our friends and families are there.

But there is also a political symbolism that for our ideals of national redemption is a sort of portico of our history and of all of the most important events in the Brazilian history of this century. It is the birthplace of Getulio Vargas, that Brazilian whose public life projected over the country. Sao Borja was the cradle of a whole social and political movement of great importance and significance. To have the opportunity to go directly to the tomb of President Vargas, pay the homage of our return, symbolizes our gratitude to the Brazilian people for having brought us back. It was the Brazilian people who eroded this regime, despite their apparent apathy. I usually say that the Brazilian people devoured the regime comprised of an armed elitist group that wanted to impose its formulas, its decrees and its packages of measures from the top down. So that, our return to Brazil has that meaning. If it is nostalgic, it is nostalgia in a good sense. A people who have no history have no destiny and we believe that the events of the past have to be cultivated and we need to derive lessons from them to see what we are going to do in the future. It is on the bases of that historic legacy that we want to become integrated in Brazilian life, in a position maturely to formulate proposals which, in my opinion, are going to govern Brazilian development in the eighties.

Question: Do you have any Ambition of power?

Answer: Personally, no. I consider myself a man who has already covered that ground and whose desire would be to win minds and to collaborate so that our people may become organized. I believe that there is no point in electing a president or a governor who have behind them only a disorganized multitude, full of hope but without being in a position to construct the development of the country with their own hands. If I had any ambition it



would be to be intensely active in the political reorganization of the Brazilian people and, in this case, reorganizing the Brazilian Labor Party (PTB). That would be my great collaboration alongside others who are probably going to organize other legitimate and respectable lines of thought.

Question: How do you view the efforts of the Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB) against abolition of the parties and the retention of the present opposition label?

Answer: I believe that that is a position that cannot be maintained in the face of the debates because it seeks to confuse the unity of the oppositions with the unity of the MDB. The MDB represents a sort of front to which the authoritarian regime assigned a monopoly of the opposition votes. Now, the unity of the opposition is a much broader question. We want unity in diversity, in which the organically structured parties will formulate their platforms and together define a common platform. It is natural that many MDB leaders should seek to defend that monopoly because they are thus defending positions they have gained. Such is the case of the MDB liberals who thus control that huge number of votes that are given to them because they cannot be given to anybody else. Another example is Mr Chagas Freitas of Rio de Janeiro. But that is not domestic. By permitting the different lines of thought to organize we will achieve the most flexible and especially the most dynamic opposition, in a position to formulate an alternative of power.

Question: Which Brazilian political leaders do you believe it will be easiest to maintain a dialog with after your return?

Answer: Everything will depend on the context I encounter. In principle, I would like to say that in returning, I do not feel unreconciled with anybody. I believe that after those 15 years and all that tragedy, it would be illogical not to dialog with anyone at all. The only ones I will not talk to are those who do not want to talk to me.

Question: What do you think of the steps taken by Deputy Ivete Vargas also to organize the PTB?

Answer: She is perfectly free to assume her positions. She has her methods and naturally, with regard to this matter, an identity of position was not possible with us, who are trying to rebuild a PTB for the new times. We do not want to make the party a little machine to serve personal designs or to support this one or that one in exchange for positions and benefits of any kind. We want to rebuild a great cause, including thinking in terms of many years of opposition in order to prepare alternative solutions when we have to assume responsibilities in the small or large administrations. With regard to Deputy Ivete Vargas, the most I can say is that I wish her luck. We are not engaging in a dispute with her or anybody else.

Question: What do you think of the intention of the [union] leader Lula to organize a workers party?



Answer: It is an initiative on the part of the Sao Paulo unionists to which we believe they have every right to aspire. With regard to the workers party, our position toward Lula and his other comrades is one of solidarity and fraternity. At the opportune time, we intend to take the initiative to open a discussion with them about the course of party organization in Brazil in accordance with the interests of the workers.

Question: Will Lula be one of your first contacts when you arrive in Brazil?

Answer: It is possible that he will be. I do not know him and do not know much about him. I do not know what his inclination will be nor do I intend to go running after anybody, forcing situations. But I wish to dialog with everybody, especially with those areas that most interest us. I hope Lula will be so inclined. If he is not, we are not going to wish him ill because of that.

#### Differences with Arraes on the Political Level

Question: How do you view the present position of former Governor Miguel Arraes?

Answer: As everyone knows, our relations prior to 1964 were very casual and during those 14 years of exile we did not have any contact. Since our recent meeting in Portugal, we began to talk and I became more familiar with his thinking. We really have differences with regard to the focus of the Brazilian situation. His somewhat Third Worldist view of our situation does not conform to the times we are living in. We have in Brazil a great Third World nation, almost as large as India, but we also have an industrialized and modern nation much greater than Belgium. It is a specific situation of ours. For example, when Lula advocates the idea of a workers party founded basically on the unions, he is advocating the social democratic concept of the industrialized nations of central Europe. There, the parties were founded on the basis of the unions and can pressure the companies, present political platforms, achieve a great level of income distribution, social benefits and general solutions for the community. A Third World worker who wants to work there needs a passport, an entry visa and an immigration certificate. In Brazil, that is not the case. The workers of our Third World come down from the Northeast and from all of the deprived areas of the country and go to the factory gates. And there at the gate, the negotiating power of the unions vis-a-vis the large companies is diluted. I believe, consequently, that the solution must be of a national nature. It is not possible to acknowledge a solution for the unionized workers without a solution for the deprived workers and vice-versa. That is our difference with former Governor Arraes. He advocates the idea of a united front. I advocate the organization of parties. His viewpoint is pre-1964 when the fascination with the Cuban revolution led us to a Third World view. But the times have changed and only a pluralist view will lead us to national emancipation.

Question: What is your opinion about these first 6 months of the Figueiredo government?

Answer: It is not possible to make a judgment in 6 months. Figueiredo is a president without democratic legitimacy and he was not elected by the Brazilian people. But there is no doubt that there is a very great difference between him and the previous chief executives. I always expressed the hope that, sensitive to the national awareness that is taking shape, he would seek to favor democratic development. As a Brazilian, I will feel extremely sad if he should not be accessible, independently of the differences that separate us. I believe that he could be more dynamic and less dilatory in adopting democratization measures that still depend on him. To my way of thinking, the quicker the country can overcome this period of transition, from tyranny to freedom, from authoritarianism to democracy, the better it will be for Brazil.

Question: How do you think the opposition should conduct itself vis-a-vis the Figueiredo government?

Answer: We are living in a still very limited state of law and the state organs themselves still have a large content of authoritarianism and illegitimacy, so that the opposition should not simply exercise its classical functions of oversight and of being the spokesman of public opinion. The opposition also has the task of promoting democracy, even more so in our case, where it is not a minority. I am certain that if elections were held now for the president of the republic, the opposition would win. It could act in many areas without being dependent on the initiatives of the executive power. One of the positions of the opposition could be precisely that of permitting the pluralism of parties.

8711

CSO: 3001

PTB INTELLECTUAL CAVALCANTI INTERVIEWED BY 'VEJA'

Sao Paulo VEJA in Portuguese 5 Sep 79 pp 3,4,6

[Interview with the intellectual mentor of the PTB, Pedro Celso Cavalcanti]

[Text] After almost 2 years of helping to prepare a program for the new Brazilian Labor Party (PTB) as an unpaid volunteer, Pedro Celso Uchoa Cavalcanti, economist, bachelor of laws, historian and sociologist, appears to have contributed so much to systematizing the ideas of the former governor of Rio Grande do Sul, Leonel Brizola, that today when the politician speaks, it is impossible not to hear the underlying academic accent of the professor. Cavalcanti is slowly preparing to return home after 16 years of exile, at the age of 42 and on the eve of the birth of his first grandchild. Since 1964, he has wandered through Bolivia, Chile and Poland, becoming a professor in the sociology department of the University of Washington in St. Louis and of the history department of the School of Humanities of Lisbon. For the past 4 years he has been living 6 months in the United States and 6 months in Portugal where, replacing Roger Garaudy, he is also the editor of the "Socialist Alternatives" series of the Arcadia Publishing House. In 1976 he coordinated the publication of "Memoires of Exile," with Jovelino Ramos. In December at the end of the school year of Washington University, which will retain him on its staff for annual 4-month courses, he will again go to Lisbon to pick up his books and only then will he leave for Brazil, by ship "so he can get used to the idea." He, therefore, returns at the leisurely pace of one who does not want to plunge into Brazilian politics but who wants to witness the country's social transformation--"like an intellectual, participating the way the intellectuals participate in the Italian Communist Party."

They Want To Gather the People Together in Order To Manipulate Them

Question: What is an intellectual like you doing in the PTB?

Answer: What's so strange about that? It is a collaboration that begins through Brizola, not through the PTB. And to understand it, it is necessary to know the effect Brizola's arrival hereabouts had on the Brazilian exile colony. It was dispersed; he arrived and succeeded in unifying the various factions. As far as I am concerned, those reasons alone are sufficient to justify working within the PTB, although he continues to be viewed with disdain by the intellectuals, and with bad faith and envy by the politicians.

Question: Bad faith?

Answer: That's right. For example, that history of gathering everybody into a single political group, believing that the history of democracy consists in putting everybody into the same party, into the same bag. It is either bad faith or a serious error. There are even two premises that are believed to be true that are very detable. The first is the one that states that the people as a whole think the same and that for that reason there should be a "people's party," as the "party of the working class" was before. That is an antidemocratic view. Thus, the first false premise is that tradition of the single party that exists among the left. The second is to believe or to say that the people are always right.

Question: Isn't that the basis of the ideology of the left?

Answer: That is another myth. The people supported Hitler, they supported Mussolini. The people, like all of us, are sometimes right and sometimes wrong. There are strikes that are proper and there are strikes that are wrong. It is necessary for the politicians with national responsibility to have the courage to say that.

Question: Could you give us an example of wrong strikes?

Answer: The one of the Italian pilots. They already earn astronomical salaries. And with their strike they hurt all of society and the democratic cause; and that is what is always at stake, not the isolated right to strike. The miners' strike in Chile is another example, they helped to overthrow the government of Salvador Allende.

Question: And why is it so difficult to say that when those strikes are going on?

Answer: There is a left now that wants to hide behind the people, just as it wants to put them all together in order to manipulate them, when the ideal is to create the largest possible number of vehicles so that the diversity of our people can be expressed.

Question: Can't the opposition front still render a service in Brazil?

Answer: The dictatorship is combatted by creating legal parties, if possible, clandestine ones, when there is no other way. It is not by waiting for the mythical moment when the dictatorship ends to then form the diversified parties. The struggle against the dictatorship is begun precisely by party organization.

What Is Totalitarian Is of the Right

Question: Wouldn't the front at least have some tactical advantages?



Answer: There is no point in the left appearing in Brazil in disguise, trying to show that it does not have any models. What it may be is ashamed of its models. Or sometimes, in terms of models, what remained for some is Albania. That is not important because what the public should get from the left in Brazil is not the abandonment of superseded models but of superseded causes.

Question: What causes?

Answer: What I want to know from those who advocate the fronts is if at the hour of democracy they are committed to the democratic cause, with a multiparty system, with freedom of the press—including freedom of the press they are going to call bourgeois, because the one that differs with them is always bourgeois—with the right to strike, with the daily struggle for all the problems of society, without reserving any of them "for after assuming power."

Question: You mean that one should mistrust the Brazilian left?

Answer: It's not that. It is merely another thing that exile taught me: I can no longer think of right and left as I did at the time I left Brazil. I left thinking that everybody who was in favor of socialism belonged to the left, and everybody who was against it belonged to the right. But that also assumes the historic connotations of each people. In the United States to belong to the left still means to be liberal. In France, the liberal Giscard d'Estaing is the candidate of the right. In Italy, the Communist Party is of the left, in Poland it is of the right.

Question: Of the right, the Communist Party?

Answer: The second day I was in Poland a member of the academy of sciences took me to a tea house and told me: "You came from Latin America; here to belong to the left is to be against the party."

Question: How can one get his bearings in all that confusion?

Answer: As far as I am concerned, today what is totalitarian is of the right, and what contributes to the advancement of the democratic cause and the construction of a democratic socialism is of the left. But real socialism, not social democracy.

Question: Does the PTB have the capability to do that?

Answer: I, at least, believe that the PTB has to attack the question of authoritarianism in all fronts of society, beginning within itself. Authoritarianism comes from far back. It begins in the family itself, with the oppression of the woman. Half of the population oppresses the other half of the population, larger even than the working force; that is how we should view the question of the oppressed woman in the family. To be of the left, therefore, implies a daily commitment to the cause of the equality of women.



The ethical commitment of the man of the left is not to oppress his wife, not to be authoritarian with his children. There is no democratic state if the family is not democratic. Socialism also begins in bed.

Question: That is the home. What is the code of the left, outside?

Answer: In education, for example: in Brazil, all the population must receive schooling, it must have free access to education. I am tired of listening to teachers speak about the liberation of the workers and behaving in the classroom like feudal barons. The third essential condition for the advance to democratic socialism is to put an end to the relations of capitalist production by developing forms of selfmanagement, cooperativism, and so forth, in all possible correlations of forces. This requires that democratic socialism not make the unions transmission belts for political parties and that union policy not be subordinated to interests other than those of the workers.

#### A Labor Party Senator Is No Longer a Worker

Question: Is the party of the metalworkers, Lula, a case in point?

Answer: From what I know here on the outside, I believe it is very normal that there should be union leaders who want to form their party. But I believe the Labor Party (PT) plan is not feasible, especially because if that party should exist it cannot be a party of cadres comprised exclusively of workers: it will have councilmen, mayors, deputies, who as such are politicians and not workers. A senator elected by the PT will be a senator, not a worker. The most that can be achieved in that sense is a model of the British Labor Party type. I am also perplexed about what definition of worker that PT is proposing. If it is only the industrial worker, then the plan is bad. If it includes the tertiary sector, it is going to get into the middle class and ceases to be the party conceived at the present time.

Question: Is faith in Brizola enough for the conversion of the PTB?

Answer: It is obvious that it does not depend on Brizola alone. The PTB can become the great people's party of the country if the Brazilian intellectuals lose their prejudice against populism. Because the PTB has to cease being an opposition party and become a government party. In that program, Brizola and labor bring the people. The intellectuals need to bring the ideas, the solutions. One of the national problems is that when the intellectuals work for the government they end up being like technocrats recruited by the right.

Question: Why does it have to be the PTB?

Answer: The PTB is the best choice because it has roots in Brazilian history, because it is rooted in popular sentiments. What is Sandinism in Nicaragua if not something that has its origins in the 1920's? Why is it that to this day, Emilia-Romagna is politically leftist? Anyone who saw

Bertolucci's "1900" must have noted that the region was antifascist even in the last century. You know, an important thing that exile taught me was the influence of history.

Question: But you were a historian in Brazil?

Answer: But as an intellectual of the left, I thought only about models. It was in exile that I became aware of the influence that local history has; for example, in Bolivia, where the native past--the population being 85 percent native--prevents the systems imported from Europe by the thinking of the left from having much impact on the contemporary situation of the country. Later, I saw in Chile how the exploitation of the mineworkers, which is a tradition of Chile's colonial past, caused organized, popular and strong parties to emerge. A clear case of that experience in exile: Poland, where Marxism is mixed with logical positivism, which is part of the Polish culture. There, there is antisemitism in socialism. What exists among the population also exists within the party.

Parties Should Not Use the Church

Question: Is the PTB the form of Brazilian socialism?

Answer: The PTB is rooted very deeply in the Brazilian experience, and since its leader is named Leonel Brizola, it can be the road to socialism in Brazil.

Question: It would not be to social democracy?

Answer: I am not a social democrat. Incidentally, if there is anything of the social democrat about Brizola it is this: he wants to create a real political party in Brazil, something there has never been in Brazil.

Question: Or to populism?

Answer: First of all, the main theorizing about populism in Brazil comes from Sao Paulo, which is understandable because the state always revolved around populist leaders. Brizola, however, hardly understands when they call him a populist. He is from Rio Grande do Sul, where the PTB was born at the factory gates, not in the offices of the Estado Novo, as occurred in the other states. In the second place, with regard to that talk of populism, of the mistrust it arouses: the PTB is the old, and the Brazilian left always thinks in terms of the storming of the Winter Palace (VEJA: Reference to the storming of the Winter Palace of Czar Nicholas II in St Peterburg by the Bolsheviks during the 1917 Russian Revolution), of those moments in which history is canceled and everything starts anew. In short, of revolution: the past ends; before there was capitalism, today socialism begins.

Question: Does that [mentality] exist?

Answer: The left does not even look at its own past. Wherever there has been socialism in the world, the consequence always comes from the past. Stalin is not only a phenomenon of Leninism, he is a Russian phenomenon. It is not by chance that the Prague Spring occurred in Czechoslovakia and not in Bulgaria.

Question: What is the solution?

Answer: In my view, the thing is to create the new through the old.

Question: And the path?

Answer: The path now is the one that lies before us: amnesty, the formation of parties, the Constituent Assembly. In that order.

Question: Does the social program of the Church defend the interests of the masses?

Answer: When I left Brazil almost 16 years ago, there was a Church that was completely different from the one that operates today. I have read what I can of the material coming from the Catholic forces in the country and I am dazzled by the contribution they have been making. In that regard, it is very important that no political force try to appropriate that work of the church, placing a priest in the central committee of a party. They always have to have their own channels to continue to do what they have done.

Question: But can there be collaboration?

Answer: In the monstrous dictatorship that existed in Brazil, it was normal for all the forces to join together in the same battle. It is inevitable that in a more open and pluralist society, that may not continue. It is natural, for example, that progressive lay forces may clash with the Church on the issue of abortion. In addition, whereas it is true that there was an old PTB, it is equally true that there was an old Church. Whoever has made history has a past, and whoever has a past has committed mistakes.

Question: Could the Brazilian Communist Party have a place in the reorganization of parties?

Answer: I consider its legalization to be basic, essential. Above all, because of democratic consistency on my part, and also because anticommunism has always been used by the right in Brazil to strike at communists and non-communists and to impede the whole process of loss of its privileges. In short, because I am hopeful that in this new world in which we are living today, the Brazilian Communist Party may be able to make a real contribution to the democratic struggles.

The Interrogator in the United States Is Polished

Question: Would you have reached those conclusions without the exile?

Answer: Look, if I had not lived for 10 years in the United States, I would never have understood that American liberalism really does exist. In 1970 I was interrogated three times by American authorities: the students in my university took an active part in the demonstration against the war in Vietnam and I, though a foreigner, supported their movement as I could. Thus, I came into contact three times with polished interrogators, armed with an extensive dossier about me. My wife was expelled from the United States on the pretext that we were not married, which was a violation of state law. I ended up by having to leave the country. At that time, the university gave me a full year's salary even though I had only worked 3 months. It kept the position open. In 1972 I returned to its staff as an immigrant.

Question: That is liberalism?

Answer: Yes, it was. At a difficult political moment, I did not have a regular job, I was there without a passport and the university did everything to support me against the pressures of the government. But that is the institutional type. The most forceful example was the indignation of my colleagues, of the whole faculty. Incidentally, they never did understand how it was that I did not have a passport.

8711

CSO: 3001

MEANING OF BRIZOLA RETURN ANALYZED BY 'VEJA'

Sao Paulo VEJA in Portuguese 12 Sep 79 pp 20-25

[Text] Wearing the same denim jacket that cost him \$80 in New York early this year and with a tricolor insignia of the Brazilian Labor Party in his lapel, engineer Leonel Brizola, 57 years old, arrived at the Foz do Iguacu airport at 1725 hours last Thursday to end the longest exile lived by a Brazilian politician. He descended from an eight-seat, two-motor Piper plane that brought him from Asuncion. With measured steps and arm-in-arm with his wife, Neusa, and holding his granddaughter, Leila, by the other, he crossed the runway waving happily. It would have been a perfect scene had it not been for the absence of the public. Outside, only 200 persons applauded the leader of the Brazilian Labor Party, a detail that did not seem to worry the honoree. On the contrary, the travel plan of the most hated enemy of the victors of 1964 was drawn up to prevent the risk of clashes. One of the steps devised by the one who drew up the itinerary, in this case Brizola himself, was to avoid large crowds, especially in the large cities.

That choice transforms the former governor of Rio Grande do Sul, certainly the most notable figure among those amnestied 2 weeks ago by President Joao Figueiredo, into a recruit for political reconciliation. Since his arrival, Brizola has spoken little and cautiously. In a short open-air interview close by the falls in Foz do Iguacu, he noted that Figueiredo has a program that responds to "many aspirations of the people." On the following morning, Friday, taken to Sao Borja, the native soil of former President Getulio Vargas, the best man at his wedding, and Jango Coulart, his brother-in-law, he declared: "If necessary, I will also talk with the government." And finally speaking to the members of the provisional general staff of the Brazilian Labor Party (PTB), friends of the old guard of Rio Grande do Sul and some representatives of the young and eager left wing, who went to receive him with banners that proclaimed "popular and socialist laborism," Brizola prescribed the three golden rules to be observed by all his followers in the coming months: caution, patience and prudence.

Private Affairs: That is the recipe of one who seeks to achieve power. And Brizola wants exactly that, in the long term. Like a campaigning politician, he slept less than 5 hours from the time he left the Hotel Roosevelt in New York Wednesday afternoon until he retired to the ranch of his



nephew, Joao Vicente, son of Jango, in Sao Borja late Friday night for a family weekend. At all of his appearances he displayed a broad smile riveted on his face, without ever showing any fatigue, even after jolting over the dirt roads on the Rio Grande do Sul ranch, surrounded by a crowd of 5,000 faithful who besieged him on his arrival in the land of historic PTB-ism.

That disposition does not seem to infect the majority of those benefited by the amnesty. Last week, old exiles and former political prisoners devoted themselves to their private affairs. Fernando Gabeira, journalist, former expatriate who spent 10 years in exile, arrived in Rio on Saturday, 31 August, was picked up at the airport to the strains of the song of the Flamengo soccer team, which was returning from a European tour on the same flight, and left the following day on a trip to Cabo Frio. Another former expatriate, Francisco Nelson Chaves, who had returned to Brazil clandestinely and was serving time in Sao Paulo, had an automobile accident in Rio, where he had gone as soon as he was freed by the amnesty. And at least three other exiles who arrived last week, beginning with former Federal Deputy Maurilio Ferreira Lima, said that their first objective in Brazil was to observe the political terrain and to satisfy their nostalgia before beginning their new political activities. It is possible that that course will change when other exiles arrive, such as Miguel Arraes, who is leaving Algiers this Friday, and Luiz Carlos Prestes, who received a telephone call from the Brazilian Embassy in Moscow with the information that his documents are ready, and has announced his readiness to return immediately.

**Traditional Concessions:** Since the amnesty, catching signals from the government, sending messages by smoke signals and establishing a system of tacit agreements, Brizola and many exiles who are returning, as well as old politicians who are reorganizing, are weaving the fabric of a period of national reconciliation. That reconciliation returns Brazilian conservative forces to their old tradition of, by making concessions, adapting situations that from the social or political points of view appear to be unadaptable. The very term, created in 1957, when Honorio Hermeto de Carneiro Leao, the Marquis of Parana, formed a cabinet that did not discriminate between liberals and conservatives, was coined by those who were in power.

Parana, a veteran conservative, had the shrewdness to preside over a government that disarmed liberal spirits and gave the Empire and slavery a good part of the 31 years of survival it enjoyed. From Parana to Dutra, the war minister of the Estado Novo dictatorship and the principle of the 1946 Constituent Assembly, the great conservative virtue was the capacity to conciliate. Only in 1964 did the traditionalist forces, after a scare and a victory, break with that rule and launched a system that gave the conservatives 15 years of uninterrupted power. A term of such length occurred only in the Old Republic, a period that is still condemned by the old generals of 1964, whose great pride still is the fact that they were revolutionaries in 1930.

The conservatives decided to conciliate, something that has nothing to do with capitulating, and at times General Figueiredo resembles Dutra. It

would be incorrect to say that he resembles Parana because he lacks not only the political shrewdness of Carneiro Leao but also his oratory. It would be worse still to believe, as does Brizola, that he may resemble Adolfo Suarez, responsible for the Spanish political relaxation.

The former governor of Rio Grande do Sul, however, needs to believe that there is room for him and if he did not believe even a little in Figueiredo, he would never sincerely believe that he has a future role to play. He frequently says cleverly that "Castello, Geisel and Golbery are all peas in the same pod, the old pod of conspiracy against the regime of 1946." He forgets, however, that Colonel Figueiredo, on certain occasions, was more radical than the three put together.

**Praise for the Enemies:** For the first act of reconciliation, however, none of the adversaries of 1964 show such dedication as former Governor, beginning with the praise he had before and after his arrival for the enemies who defeated him 15 years ago. The government's signals to the camp of the adversary are not less significant. On the afternoon of the same day that the adversary of the 1960's was returning from exile, for example, President Joao Figueiredo, once again mentioned the signal of reconciliation in a speech to 500 Minas mayors in Belo Horizonte. "For us Brazilians, hope lies in the idea of union, of cohesion," said the president after having defended the amnesty and issued a well-aimed warning "to those who are striving to turn back the pages of history." This sympathetic admonition was preceded by others, undoubtedly more useful. It is true that the Brazilian Government transmitted to Brizola through a mutual intermediary—who is not the Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB) Deputy Thales Ramalho or former deputy Ivete Vargas, as was speculated early this year—the express recommendation that he not return before the promulgation of amnesty.

The bearer of the suggestion, who is a university professor, spoke with the PTB leader, immediately after Brizola had expressed a readiness to pack his bags and return to Brazil without further ado, as he said at least once last April, speaking to reporters in New York. Brizola retreated and became progressively appreciative of the amnesty plan, which benefited him 2 weeks ago. Since then he has been putting all of his hope of rapprochement in Figueiredo—and strategically distilling all criticism of the government of former President Geisel. It is an expedient that resolves the problems of the former governor with his opposition colleagues. But it can be bad business in the future because Figueiredo does not seem to be available for an agreement that will cost him Geisel's loyalty. When he began his return trip, for example, Brizola fired another barb against the former president. In an interview with the JORNAL DO BRASIL, he accused Geisel of being responsible for the ills of the Brazilian Petroleum Corporation (Petrobras). The reply of one of Figueiredo's friends was: "The oil problem in Brazil is that all the illiterates who began to talk about the subject only complicated the situation."

Hand Extended to the Enemies: Slightings of that kind which can be attributed to the prolonged exile, do not help Brizola's transit through the inhospitable lands of the government. And they certainly jeopardize his effort to improve relations with the military. In the main speech of the coming-home party in Sao Borja, for example, an improvised 1-hour affair that did not excite the 5,000 PTB followers who went there to attend the resurrection of their party, the former governor spoke cautiously. During a good part of the time, he talked to the people, replied to questions and unlike some speakers who perceded him, such as former Rio Deputy Lysaneas Maciel, avoided using the word "dictatorship," a habit he has been cultivating since New York. But his message, repeated at least 10 times, informed the people that the "strength of the PTB is in the failure of the regime." A mistake that can cost him much more than all the effort to act like a moderate follower of the ideas of transformation derived from European social democracy.

It so happens that Brizola seems to believe that in extending his hand to the enemies, he is making friends. Nevertheless, his quiet arrival in Foz do Iguaçu was assured only 2 hours before the landing of the little plane that brought him from Asunción, by a telephone message from Brasília that ordered his name erased from the list of undesirables in the Federal Police computer, where it was still stored despite the amnesty law. The entry visa was dispatched in 1 minute, stamped by the Maritime Police Officer Antonio de Padua da Mata Machado, son of ousted former Federal Deputy Edgar da Mata Machado and brother of a youth who died in prison. But during his very first talk with an aide who lives in Porto Alegre, the recently arrived PTB leader examined a grim printed invitation to his own funeral distributed the day before to many of his friends in Rio Grande do Sul.

Day-to-day politics brings back the problems he left frozen behind him since 1964. On his arrival in Sao Borja, Brizola found a telegram from MDB Senator Paulo Brossard, historic liberal whom the PTB supported in the 1974 elections. "Welcome home; greetings to Dona Neusa," he greeted his old enemy, with a rare economy of words, transformed into an ally by the tribulations of partisanship. It was enough for Brizola to order the reception committee that no banners criticizing Brossard be unfurled at the Friday night rally. The truce operated in almost all sectors. With the exception of some old disaffected communists, whose company he definitely does not want, Brizola spoke well of all the names of politicians of Sao Borja that came to mind.

But in his first day in Rio Grande do Sul, the PTB chief did not mention the MDB a single time. Irrked by the complete silence with reference to the current label of the opposition, Senator Pedro Simon, who consolidated and led the Rio Grande do Sul section of the MDB and whose name was also not mentioned a single time by the recent arrival--is thinking of delaying joining the PTB for several weeks.

There is no hurry in organizing the command of the new party. But the scratches of the first day reveal that the task will be a delicate one as was indicated by the diversity of projects among the 27 members of Brizola's entourage, which left New York with great enthusiasm last Wednesday. Five of its members, including the former governor's daughter, Neusa Maria, remained at the Dulles airport in Washington, lost during a technical stop.



During the rest of the trip, while Dona Neusa was being consoled about the absence of her daughter, a discussion ensued between former State Deputy Helio Fontoura, "Fontourinha," 54 years of age, an industrialist, who in recent months has been acting as Brizola's private secretary out of dedication to the leader, and geologist Jose Carlos Mendes, 32 years of age, former terrorist exiled since 1971, who joined the laborites a few weeks ago. "Fontourinha" was talking about the return to power. And Mendes was thinking out loud about the Brazilian journey to socialism. Arriving at Foz do Iguacu without a passport, the geologist wrapped himself in the Brazilian flag and cried, while "Fontourinha" hastened to organize Brizola's agenda for that night--a succession of meetings that ended at 3 o'clock Friday morning.

State Protection: That incompatibility was accentuated in Sao Borja. On Thursday morning, the eve of the leader's arrival, the young wing of the Porto Alegre PTB arrived in the city with a plan to set up their own security service. Before lunch, however, they were displaced by reality with the arrival of Colonel Helio Loro, one of the division chiefs of the State Security Secretariat, also dispatched from Porto Alegre. The colonel parked his blue and white station wagon in front of the city hall, before walls tarred with the message of "popular and socialist PTB," and calmly entered for a meeting with interventor Salvador Alvarez and the PTB committee, sponsored by the rancher Joao Vicente Goulart, son of Jango, who lodged his uncle Brizola and loaned him the plane in which he flew from Asuncion to Rio Grande do Sul. There it was agreed that the recent-arrival's security would be controlled by the state. And that is what occurred. Brizola landed, discreetly surrounded by 15 Federal Police agents and made the drive from the private airfield in Joao Vicente's ranch to the center of Sao Borja in an open car flanked by two detectives from the Department of Political and Social Order (DOPS).

That way, despite the political scratches, the reconciliation worked at the outset. Brizola feels secure in the Rio Grande do Sul front, a sort of private preserve to the point of confirming his reintroduction rally in Porto Alegre, scheduled for this Thursday despite the advice of "Fontourinha" and other friends of the "historic wing," who would like to see the leader opt for a 2-week stay at his nephew's ranch to reconnoiter the environment more carefully.

After this promised rally, however, the plans are less concrete. Brizola announced that he will come to Rio as soon as possible, where he plans to divide his time between administration of the PTB's patrimony and the direct challenge to Governor Chagas Freitas. However, that can be a greater challenge than the recently arrived mentor of the PTB imagines. The exercise of reconciliation has enabled Brizola to reoccupy his domains but it will be of little help when he tries to dislodge the Donee of the Rio government--himself a practitioner of a sort of unbeatable reconciliation, "operation infiltration" which in recent weeks, for example, has led his agents to "hitch a ride" on the tarred graffiti of adversaries, by asking friends to add the words "Long live Chagas," to the graffiti that mar the walls of the municipal theater.

Nervousness: In addition to the hardships of political life in Rio, Brizola will have to avoid the traps that threaten to transform his readiness for reconciliation into a collision course with those who have not yet become convinced of his good intentions. Sometimes the risks of confrontation do not appear through the fault of the laborite leader. But his arrival has increased the nervousness of his adversaries. There are reports that last week, for example, the commander of the Third Army, General Antonio Bandeira, asked the Rio Grande do Sul secretary of security, Pedro Leivas Job, to order the detention of two MDB councilmen of Porto Alegre, Glenio Perez and Marcos Klassman, ousted in 1977 and reintegrated in the municipal council because they received the benefit of amnesty and still had 2 years of their term to serve. The two threatened politicians have nothing to do with the PTB but they were not jailed only because the federal government intervened in time. Even last week, the three most important military commanders of Santa Catarina, including General Jose Maria de Toledo Camargo, former Planalto Palace spokesman, left the plenum of the Legislative Assembly in the midst of the speech by MDB Deputy Eugenio Stein.

But it is certainly significant that U.S. Senator Edward Kennedy, who is preparing a statement recognizing the progress of democratization of the Brazilian regime, is going to be hailed this week. Ten years ago, Senator Kennedy was censured for denouncing torture in Brazilian prisons. Now with the praise of amnesty and the reintegration of those defeated in 1964, he will be amnestied by the biased, who confused and in some cases still confuse, liberalism with leftism. As long as national politics does not reduce the rate of pollution of its inscriptions, Brizola, his PTB, the returned exiles and the very idea of reconciliation will depend on the ability of each to improvise. In the case of the former governor, for example, former MDB Deputy Moab Caldas, white-magic [umbanda] leader of Rio Grande do Sul, asserted, to the sound of bongo drums, that "we already detect that he needs to be much more careful of some friends than of the rest. He is carrying a big load of envy."

8711

CSO: 3001



'MANCHETE' INTERVIEWS MIGUEL ARRAES

Rio de Janeiro MANCHETE in Portuguese 15 Sep 79 pp 13-14

[Interview with ex-Pernambuco Governor Miguel Arraes; in Paris, date not given]

[Text] Question: What is your opinion of the first months of the Figueiredo government?

Answer: The government of General Figueiredo is a continuation of what has been happening for some time. The crisis he now faces is the same one that has been accumulating, and in my opinion the measures necessary to halt and reduce its effects were not taken at the proper time. As is known, the crisis has been coming since the beginning of the seventies and those responsible for the economic crisis--which, incidently, are the same ones for 15 years--gambled on the crisis as if it were a transitory thing. In fact that international crisis on which that group blames what is happening in Brazil is the product of the type of thinking and the concept of development of these people responsible for the financial policy of the last 15 years. They severed the little autonomy that existed in the country's economy and excessively internationalized the economy. Now they cannot nor do they have the right to complain about the internationalization which they themselves effected, about the cuts they made in the country's defense systems, which could reduce the effects of that crisis, attenuate it. In my opinion, that is the real problem. The present government is the continuation of that situation that is becoming aggravated.

Question: And what remedies do you have to propose?

Answer: We must be convinced that this crisis is not going to pass. On the contrary, we are going to pay for the crisis if quick measures are not taken. It is countries like ours that are going to pay for the crisis; not their crisis but the crisis of others. I do not believe this is the time to give prescriptions, I do not want to give them. I merely want to call attention to this fact, so that we will not focus merely on the incidental. General Figueiredo has his share of responsibility for the present state of things because he participated during all of these years as a support of the regime. However, we cannot say that the general state of Brazil is due to a few months of the present administration. The main responsibility, I repeat, belongs to the type of thinking that controls Brazilian development, which is elitist and has bypassed a large segment of the population.

Question: And what must be done to change that model of development?

Answer: The changes basically should occur on the economic level in order that there may be change on the social level. But in order to do that much deeper political changes are needed than the limited and narrow measures that are still being adopted in that area. We should not be deceived by the so-called opening and I believe we should speak clearly at this time because the greatest contribution that those who want to pose opposition to the regime and the government is not to forget the difficulties of the country and of the people. We who are posing opposition do not want to intensify those difficulties. We want to diminish them, to reduce them, and our greatest contribution is to point out those basic issues and not simply to join with the government or undertake a false reconciliation with the regime. The greatest contribution lies in expressing our thoughts. I believe that social conflicts increased in Brazil due in large part to the government's economic-financial policy. And that needs to be said. We cannot hide the fact that there are social conflicts and we must point them out right now so that if some months from now those movements appear and grow we will not be blamed for something that is the fault of the regime, we will not be used as the scapegoat. We are fully aware that we must voice criticism and alert everyone to that aspect. All those who are concerned about the crisis of the country and the situation of our people--and not only about their personal problems of reintegration in political life--should now speak frankly because only thus will there be a real debate. Even with those who combat us. An exchange of ideas that the people will judge and that will indicate the way to solve the problems.

Question: And do those movements to which you refer have a solid political base for the task of socio-economic reconstruction?

Answer: I think the people's awareness has advanced in these recent 15 years much more than is believed. The people have a lot of wisdom and it is a mistake to disdain it. Despite all of the authoritarianism and everything, the people have known how to open small paths. And today there are different union movements, associations, movements of professionals of all types in Brazil. Even the Brazilian Bar Association and the Church have had influential participation in the political process. There was likewise a great purge within our own ranks, a positive fact because it purified the development of the popular movement in Brazil, which acquired greater integrity and maturity making it possible for the country and the people to emerge from the difficulties they are experiencing.

Question: Do you believe that General Figueiredo will have the strength to carry out the process of political opening to the end?

Answer: I am not in a position to assess General Figueiredo's strength. What I can say is that he has several years of administration ahead of him and everything will depend on how he is able to conduct the clash of forces that exist in the country.

I believe that his government will experience the sharp crisis that exists within it and since he has that responsibility, he must have the necessary awareness to reflect and assume the necessary positions. Especially when

everybody knows that we favor free debate. Furthermore, I had already stated that I would enter the country only if I could speak. And to speak, debate and contend does not mean to agitate, to be demagogic or to conspire. We are going to try to open the paths of a real democracy in Brazil.

Question: Are there differences or affinities between your position and that of Leonel Brizola?

Answer: In a document recently published by the press, I set forth what had to be said. A short time ago an interview was published in which Leonel Brizola allegedly made some comments about my line of action. I have no confirmation in that regard--without casting doubt on the integrity of the organs that published them, of course. But those statements by Mr Brizola about me seem strange. And I reserve the right not to reply to them until I verify their source.

Question: What are the greatest memories you have of those 15 years of exile?

Answer: I will say that a little later because that is in the area of reminiscence. But though exile has the negative aspect of taking us away from our native land, the experience of exile teaches a great deal. Despite all the communications systems we have in Brazil, we are still a relatively isolated country. I was able to keep abreast of the Algerian process of evolution, quite different from ours. I was able to compare many things. But all of that is a subject for later. The important thing now is to speak about the present and the future. When I can no longer act and only write, I will leave my memoirs.

Question: What is your state of mind on the eve of returning to Brazil?

Answer: Obviously, that even arouses great emotion. I hope to see new paths open in our country. Despite knowing the difficulties and limitations that exist there now I am entering with a strong spirit, prepared to make my contribution together with those who carried out the democratic resistance.

Question: How did you receive the amnesty action by congress?

Answer: I believe that in a certain way the pressures coming from national opinion touched congress and the result shows that in a certain way the government suffered a defeat. And what that defeat teaches is simple: amnesty must be extended to everyone; it must be broad and unrestricted. It must open paths so that not only we exiles may return and speak but also open channels of expression for national public opinion. Because if the people can express themselves, they will collaborate to resolve the difficulties of our country. But in order to do this it is necessary to have a legitimization of power. And that will only happen with the convocation of a freely elected Constituent Assembly and with the modification of all the "Acts of Exception," which do not permit a broader expression of ideas in Brazil. As in the case with the Falcao Law for elections and communications systems, it

reduces the possibilities of intercommunication which are extremely important, especially in a country as large as ours. The Brazilians must know what is going on and not what some want them to know. There has to be a confraternization, a communication, not coming from the top but from the bottom, between the different social sectors of our country.

Question: What is your opinion of the intention of the government to carry out a party reform?

Answer: My opinion was already expressed in the document I had published. As far as I am concerned, there is no difference between a biparty system or a multiparty system if they are created from the top down. The parties can only emerge after a real redemocratization of the country, when all lines of thought have had the right to express themselves, debate and ponder the problems. Only then can the various tendencies take a course of their own. Now, if the reform is made from the top down, like a game with marked cards where the one who is running the game knows the result, dictating what should be done, then that is not party reform. It is merely a power game to facilitate the continuity of the incumbent. That cannot continue because the social effects are evident to all Brazilians.

Question: What are the new leaderships that have emerged in Brazil in the course of the party reform?

Answer: Brazil has new leaderships today not only on the political and party levels but also in the union and student sectors and in all areas. Many of them are not known, are limited to certain areas, and thus since the people gained awareness during those 15 years, leaders have emerged at all levels. Those who, like myself, have already had participation in the political life of the country should join with those leaderships so that together with them we can compare experiences mistakes and successes; to arrive at a course more in keeping with our real situation.

8711

CSC: 3001

'LE MONDE' INTERVIEWS GOVERNOR MIGUEL ARRAES

Paris LE MONDE in French 16-17 Sep 79 p 2

[Interview by Dominique Dhombres of the former governor of the state of Pernambuco, Miguel Arraes, in Paris on 14 September: "The Structures of the Dictatorship Are Still There but Popular Protest is Stronger"]

[Text] Among the political exiles now returning to Brazil on the strength of the recent amnesty law, Mr Miguel Arraes, former governor of the state of Pernambuco in the northeast, arrested immediately following the military coup in 1964 and exiled in Algeria since 1964, occupies a special position. Christian and an independent, he attempted during the few months of his governorship of the State of Pernambuco to bring together all men of good will, Christians as well as Marxists, to find a remedy for the fearful poverty of the population. This original experiment, brutally interrupted by the military (men), has not been forgotten in Brazil.

Mr Miguel Arraes, passing through Paris Friday 14 September, answered our questions before flying on to Brazil, where he is expected Saturday and where he is due to participate in a meeting at Recife.

[Question] How do you feel, returning to Brazil after 14 years of exile?

[Answer] I know I will find an entirely new situation. The world has changed a lot over those 14 years, and Brazil perhaps even more [than elsewhere]. The military government undertook a very vigorous program of economic modernization which had enormous social repercussions. The inequalities have increased still more, which is not to say that we are on the eve of a revolution. Our country must find a solution for the reduction of social and regional disparities that are the consequence of an economic policy which has abandoned any notion of national independence.



[Question] In perspective, how do you view your performance in Northeast [Province]? Have you been able to maintain connection with the people who helped you back in those days?

[Answer] My position has always been a special one. In my region, the northeast, it had been possible to constitute a sort of front, especially at Recife, where for the first time people of very different political horizons got together, Catholics and Protestants, socialists, communists and independents like myself. It was not a true party, but rather an entente united on immediate and concrete objectives relating to the needs of the population. No one ever discussed theory...

All that is in the past, but I believe the inclination still exists. One isolated action in one part of Brazil has no meaning; we are working towards the formation of a national front on the very broad base I was referring to. I have stayed in contact with individuals of every shade of political opinion, and from every condition in society.

[Question] Another exile, Mr Leonel Brizola, leader of the Brazilian Workers Party, has just returned, and he enjoys the support of the European Social Democrats. How do you place your action with respect to Mr Brizola, and what do you think of the influence of European Social Democracy, particularly the Germans, in the reconstruction of a Brazilian opposition?

[Answer] Mr Brizola can play a part in a national front, but we differ as to methods. He wants to form a party with alliances at the top between personalities. I am not a party chief. I want the unity that comes from the foundation [grass-roots] in the image of the resistance the people have carried on against the regime during all these years.

The Brazilian situation, moreover, is not susceptible of being reduced to a European political model. To be sure it is important to have supports on the outside, but there is no need for exclusivity, and we have no need to give our allegiance to anyone whatsoever at the risk of losing the support of other independent movements, even in Europe. For example, we have been helped by certain sectors of Italian Christian Democracy who conducted a campaign against the use of torture in Brazil, and many Catholics in Europe gave support to the resistance against the military regime.

[Question] How do you explain the partial democratization of the regime, and particularly the law of amnesty of which you are taking advantage?

[Answer] On the international level there is a quest under way for an alternative political model to military dictatorships, which can in the end amount to just another type of economic domination. In several countries there is an attempt to replace the traditional repressive military agencies with instruments better adapted to the situation, as in Greece, in Spain or in Portugal. A purely military domination has its disadvantages, and can lead to a social explosion desired by neither East nor West, as in Iran.

At the present time there is only one legal opposition party in Brazil, the Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB) which is a broad electoral front where one can find liberals and trade-unionists, for instance. The MDB is evolving, and the return of the exiles will stir it up some more. The important thing is not to divide the opposition. I have more faith in a political process than in a preestablished plan. A Uruguayan friend of mine, a doctor, told me that my return to Brazil is a bit like the entrance of a surgeon into an operating room: he is going to try something but he does not know exactly ahead of time what is going to happen. There might be complications...

[Question] What can the Brazilian church do in this current process? What is the clergy's attitude?

[Answer] I preferred to have only indirect contacts with the bishops during my years of exile, in order not to compromise them. The church can play an important role, even a fundamental one, if it is willing to function, on the lowest level, as a factor of unification and not as a factor of division. But its mission is [definitely] not to mix itself in politics at a higher level.

[Question] Some years ago you defined the regime in these pages as "the hybrid product of democracy after the American fashion and Fascist ideology." What is the current proportion of these components?

[Answer] The laws, the structures of dictatorship are still on the books, even though they are not being implemented at this moment. On the other side, the popular challenge [of the order of things] is better organized, more forceful and more generally aware, and occasionally compels the authorities to make concessions.

[Question] In your view, which is the most urgent issue: the reestablishment of freedoms or Social Democracy?

[Answer] We are confronted with a very complex process of struggle. It is necessary to broaden the base of formal democracy to the point that it becomes social democracy, an instrument for organizing the population with reference to the changes in society that are in order.

2750

CSO: 3100

## BRAZIL

### AUTHENTIC FACTION OF MDB FORMS BLOC

Sao Paulo ISTO E in Portuguese 15 Aug 79 pp 16-17

[Text] A new party bloc is enlivening the corridors and offices of the National Congress. It is the bloc of the MDB [Brazilian Democratic Movement] authentic faction, established as an active and numerous group on Wednesday of last week. It already has the formal support of 82 federal deputies and 2 senators at least, as well as the qualified endorsements of Alencar Furtado, Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Almino Affonso. The banner of the bloc bears the legend of the MDB, but its members have already given notice, in a document released last Thursday, that "if political events lead the MDB to disband," the group will "establish a party with a popular and democratic content to serve as the voice of the political forces which will not compromise with the dictatorial regime and are fighting to defend the cause of the workers and the people in general, as well as the national interests."

As an ideological definition, we have here something lying between liberal and slightly progressive. Or, let us say, vaguely leftist. But this is not the important thing at the moment and, in truth, some of the members of the bloc, although they may not admit it, would prefer to avoid the term "leftist." This is the vestige of a fear which, when it was born, in the dark days of Institutional Act No 5, was fully justified. History has now made changes, but it takes people time to become accustomed.

One day, however, they will have changed and learned. As was noted by an exultant Deputy Fernando Lyra of Pernambuco, a member of the authentic faction of the MDB. "For the first time in the past 15 years," he said last Thursday, articulating the phrase "first time" with relish, "we are ahead of the regime. We have considered all the alternatives."

### The Left Wing

The potential of the group is not very great, because the rules of the game after all are simple. If the government--which has authority enough to make the choice--prefers to maintain the present party structure, the members of the authentic faction will remain in the MDB. If the two parties are forced

to disband, the members of the authentic faction, who in the document last week resolved "to assume the commitment to act together as a group," will create their own parties. Ready to be the main party, with apologies for the term, of the Brazilian left wing.

This is the picture. The 82 federal deputies who have already signed the group's initial document may readily grow to 100--a substantial number out of the total of 189 deputies on the MDB bench. Two senators are now supporters of the bloc--Jaison Barreto, of Santa Catarina, and Henrique Santillo, of Goias. The support of at least two others is regarded as certain: Roberto Saturnino, of Rio, and Marcos Freire, of Pernambuco.

But the strength of the group goes beyond this, as its organizers speculated last week. Those who do not want to support the PTB [Brazilian Labor Party], or who cannot be accommodated within that group, will have only one choice--the party to which the authentic group will give rise. There are a number of political personalities in the opposition who may be moving toward such a choice. Some of them are Senators Paulo Brossard of Rio Grande do Sul, Franco Montoro of Sao Paulo, Humberto Lucena of Paraiba, and even, it is believed, the bionic Amaral Peixoto.

This is why the authentic faction members, in formalizing their organization, decided to call it simply a group. And even "group" pure and simple, the adjective "authentic" being eliminated to show that this is a new stage, and what is more important, to allow expansion into the areas which Fernando Lyra calls "liberal." The deputy from Pernambuco believes that it is still possible to obtain the endorsement of Senator Teotônio Vilela.

#### Extra-Parliamentary Support

Within this picture, the parliamentary bloc of the PTB, which is also functioning in organized fashion--that is to say more or less organized--seems almost unimportant. No more than 15 federal deputies from the MDB and 1 from the ARENA [National Renewal Alliance]--that was the score at the end of last week. As to senators, perhaps one--Leite Chaves of Parana. Thus if the current party rules are maintained, this bloc would not have the necessary quorum to establish the PTB on a formal basis. Certainly the PTB supporters have their extra-parliamentary strengths. But the group formed by the authentic faction is also seeking extra-parliamentary support, and it is doing so specifically in the trade union movement. Significantly, the document promulgated by the group carries the signatures of Benedito Marcílio, president of the Santo Andre Metallurgical Workers' Trade Union, and Aurelio Peres, a workers' leader in Sao Paulo, and in addition, a member of the coordinating commission of the group. In addition to this, the constituent document begins with a confirmation of the "Sao Bernardo commitment."

This refers to the meeting held three months ago in Sao Bernardo do Campo at which deputies in the authentic group and the trade union leaders, led by



Lula, exchanged opinions and criticisms. At that meeting it was decided that each party--the deputies and the trade union leaders--would form a commission for the pursuit of the discussion. The parliamentarians organized theirs. The most recent meeting was held precisely on Thursday, in Brasilia, at the home of Alencar Furtado, when the members of the authentic faction decided on formal organization of the group.

The trade union leaders who participated in the Sao Bernardo meeting have lagged in forming their coordinating commission. Not due to negligence, but because the majority of the leaders are more attracted by the idea of their Labor Party. "But the authentic group and the laborites will end up in the same party," Benedito Marcilio noted last week.

### The Hypothesis of Unity

Is this possible? No one in Brasilia would dare to answer in the affirmative. But news regarded as encouraging circulated among the parliamentarians--a report from Sao Paulo, brought by Ayrton Soares, to the effect that the trade union leaders would shortly appoint their coordinating commission. With this confirmed, the representatives of the parliamentarians and trade unionists could already next week resume their talks which, the parliamentary left wing hopes, might perhaps lead to a large party.

The representatives of the group made one thing very clear, however. If the MDB were to divide into more than one party, there is nothing to prevent the formation of opposition party fronts. Discussions have already been held with PTB advocates in this connection.

It was such a recommendation of unity moreover that former Governor Miguel Arraes communicated to some of the parliamentarians with whom he had talked by telephone on Thursday night. Talking to ISTOE as well, Arraes reported that he will be returning to Brazil on 16 September, a Sunday. And he will join the MDB. "I am a part of the opposition," he said, "and these groups are for the most part in the MDB."

And what about the PTB? "It is a valid undertaking by my friend Leonel Brizola," Arraes admitted, but with the reservation that "I think the majority of the parliamentary representation remains within the MDB." Informed briefly about the document of the authentic faction, the former governor commented to Fernando Lyra and Cristina Tavares that this political action should not threaten the unity of the popular opposition. Arraes admitted to ISTOE, moreover, that he is inclined to align himself with the signatories of the document.

Which means that if the PTB is Brizola's doing, the group born of the authentic faction has the support of Arraes.



# FIFTY MAJOR OPPOSITION LEADERS IDENTIFIED

Sao Paulo VEJA in Portuguese 5 Sep 79 pp 30-33

[Text] What the opposition does or fails to do in the coming years will depend to a large extent on the political decisions made by a few dozen persons. VEJA has chosen 50 persons, from among the veterans and newer faces, moderates and radicals, in the heterogenous opposition family, and we explain who they are and what they want.



Gonçaves



Mata Machado



Airton Soares



Franco Montoro

Airton Soares

He has served as counsel for political prisoners, is 34 years of age and a federal deputy for Sao Paulo. Theoretically he is to the left of the PCB [Brazilian Communist Party], and he is working for the organization of a "popular party to defend the interests of the workers' class above all." Translation: He wants to purge the MDB [Brazilian Democratic Movement] of the "adesista" faction and attract the new trade union leadership. He is willing however to coexist with "those liberals who will not compromise with the dictatorship." His fate will depend on that of the radical ring within the opposition.

Alberto Goldman

An engineer, 41 years of age, he is well endowed as a political spokesman. His mandate as state deputy hung by a thread in 1975 when the Sao Paulo securities bodies noted his affiliation with the PCB, of whose votes he was the beneficiary. He survived and rose to federal deputy. A moderate among

the radicals, he wants to maintain the MDB, even with the "adesista" faction, and "to organize the masses." His immediate goal however is to win control of the party in Sao Paulo, with the support of Senator Orestes Quercia.

#### Alceu Collares

A lawyer, 52 years of age, a federal deputy for Rio Grande do Sul since 1970, he is a founding member of the authentic club in the MDB. He has announced that he wants to "return to my origins," i.e., to the PTB [Brazilian Labor Party], where he became a politician. His personal future depends on the horoscope of Pedro Simon, Paulo Brossard, and Brizola himself.

#### Almino Afonso

A lawyer, 49, and a speaker of rare talent, he was minister of labor under Goulart, and returned from exile in 1976 with the idea of joining all left-wing factions in a single party. He is moving away from Leonel Brizola and moving closer to Miguel Arraes. He believes that the MDB is the "only path available for the struggle for democracy." With the MDB dead, he would remain with the party of the authentic faction. He has lost some strength since returning to politics, but even so, he may be the candidate of the Sao Paulo left for the Senate in 1982.

#### Andre Franco Montoro

A law professor, 63 years of age, a senator since 1970, he swears that he will not leave the MDB but is closer to the Europeanized PTB of Leonel Brizola than to the left wing of his own party. He is certain that he will run for the governorship of Sao Paulo in 1982, whether in the PTB or in the MDB, and that he will win the election. He enjoys more support than he seeks. The possibility that he will succeed Paulo Maluf is not unacceptable to the Planalto Palace.

#### Arnaldo Goncalves

A metallurgist, 41, and a trade union leader in Santos, he has links with former Deputy Marcelo Gatto. Lula has not as yet succeeded in winning him over to the PT [Labor Party]. He is not exactly enamored of the MDB but believes that "we must function with what exists." Even though he has not pursued a political career, he will serve as an auxiliary leftist line of the MDB in the Santos lowlands.

#### Chico Buarque

A composer, 35 years of age, he will participate in the Miguel Arraes meeting in Recife on the 16th. This does not mean that he will join the MDB or is seeking to pursue a political career. "I will continue to be an artist," he promises. As in 1978, the candidates interested in the leftist vote in 1982 will vie for his sponsorship in the elections. Under censorship pressure until a short time ago, he maintains a serene calm which has made him a respected intellectual. He has little inclination for festive activities.



Darcy Ribeiro

Darcy Ribeiro

Doutel

An anthropologist, 57 years of age, chief of the Civilian Household of the Presidency during the Goulart government, he is regarded as "a symbol of the challenging intellectuals," and as an intellectual, he is without a doubt skilled in developing political ideas. His sympathies lie with the PTB but he does not want to move far from Miguel Arraes, because he believes it is his role to "unify the opposition." He will be willing to run for elective office, "whatever it might be," in 1962. He is certain of one thing: "I will end up a minister." It has already been said that he was a candidate for the throne.

#### Doutel de Andrade

A lawyer, 58, he is a federal deputy who was suspended in 1966, the captain of the old PTB guard in Rio de Janeiro. A talented politician, he has much to teach the post-1964 leftist generation. For example, "The right wing is very powerful but it is not stupid." He believes that the PTB will again become what it was. A very talented speaker, he is also a fantastic storyteller, specializing in anecdotes about the inner circles of the republic.

#### Edgar da Mata Machado

A law professor, 66 years old, he was a federal deputy and was suspended in 1969, one of the last remnants of the Minas Gerais liberal school of Milton Campos. He wants to be "an active member of the opposition." He will certainly be the intellectual guide of the Minas Gerais leftist sector. He believes the MDB to be "the clearest expression of the popular will."

#### Eny Raimundo Moreira

A lawyer serving as counsel for the political prisoners, 35 years of age, she was a founder of the Brazilian Committee for Amnesty in Rio. She is not interested in pursuing politics "in the traditional fashion," but would support a future Labor Party. She is closer to Arraes than to Brizola.

### Euler Bentes Monteiro

A general in the reserve, 62 years of age, he was the MDB candidate for the presidency in 1978. Seemingly he has no political future. But this was also said of Adm Silvio Heck, in 1962, during the Goulart government. Because of these doubts, he should perhaps be regarded as a reserve for the opposition. Asked about this possibility last week, he refused gruffly to make any statement.

### Fernando Henrique Cardoso

A sociologist, 48, he bears the medals and the scars typical of the intellectual slow in coming down from the heights of ideology to the plains of daily politics. He will be in the Senate in 1983 if Franco Montoro is governor of Sao Paulo then. At present, his autonomy in flight is still limited.



Eny Raimundo      Frei Betto

### Francisco Pinto

A lawyer, 50 years of age, a hotheaded fighter at the parliamentary rostrum, he is the most strident voice in the Bahia left wing. He will continue to make a splash among the radicals. He supports the establishment of the PT. He is likely to risk the Senate race in 1982, but it would be well to bet on the candidacy of Antonio Carlos Magalhaes. His mania is the development of military alliances.

### Frei Betto

A Dominican, 35 years of age, he was not arrested until 1969, when the security organs discovered that he was after all the same Carlos Alberto Libanio Christo they were seeking. From the semi-clandestinity of that time he has emerged as the active organizer of ecclesiastical movements at the base level. He was also sought in 1978--this time by the left wing of the MDB which wanted to draw him into the party. In the MDB or out of it, he will have influence in radical circles.

### Getulio Dias

A journalist, 45 years of age, a federal deputy for the MDB from Rio Grande do Sul, he has now joined the troops supporting Leonel Brizola. He is one of the leading missionaries of the PTB in the Congress. He is agreeable to the survival of the MDB but is opposed to Lula's PT. If he has ambitions beyond continuing as a deputy, he will have to wait at least until 1986.



João Manoel

João Paulo

### Helder Camara

Archbishop of Olinda and Recife, 70 years of age, he has been a thorn in the side of the post-1964 governments. He refuses to discuss party matters but, as the most controversial opposition priest, he will certainly be a frequent interlocutor of Miguel Arraes. And he will contribute to supplying arguments for the critics of social inequality.

### Hugo Abreu

A general in the reserve, he is 62 years old. He has lost all the political battles in which he has engaged since 1977. Today his fire power is minimal. He says he has been asked to join a party but does not say which. He is devoted to Cooper and to the second volume of his memoirs, in which he takes greater pleasure in attacking former colleagues in the Planalto Palace than in saying what he did or what he will do.

### Ivete Vargas

A niece of Getulio Vargas, 52 years of age, she is a veteran interlocutor of General Golbery. She was a federal deputy from 1950 to 1968, when her term was suspended, and she contributed with her family name to putting together the populist cloak covering the PTB, Ministry of Labor and the Sao Paulo trade union leadership. She competed with Brizola for control of the name of the PTB, in which in any case she remains. She will risk all or nothing in the 1982 elections.

### Jarbas Vasconcelos

A lawyer, 37, he is president of the MDB in Pernambuco and stands in relation to Miguel Arraes in the same position as Pedro Simon of Rio Grande



do Sul does to Leonel Brizola. Had he won the election in 1978, he would be the first representative of the radical left in the Senate. He swings far wide of the PCB. He is a potential candidate for the post of prefect of Recife, if elections are held in the capital.

#### João Mineo! Cardoso de Mello

A professor of economics, 37 years of age, he was brought closer to the MDB by Ulysses Guimarães, whom he supplied during the electoral campaign last year with ammunition suitable for the opposition attack on the government's economic program. A dozen years ago he taught at the UNICAMP, but does not want to abandon either politics or the MDB.

#### João Paulo Pires de Vasconcelos

A metallurgist, 47, he is the most important trade union leader in Minas Gerais and the main spokesman of the Labor Party in that state. But unlike Lula, he rails neither at the MDB nor the PTB. "Now is not the time to divide the opposition," he says, "because the only choice now is for or against what we have."

#### Jorge Carone

A lawyer, 59, he was prefect of Belo Horizonte and was suspended in 1966. He lost his wife and children in politics and is preparing to return himself "at the earliest opportunity." He even dreams of being governor of Minas Gerais, urges unity in the opposition, and does not define himself in party terms. He will probably join the PTB. He has voter support.



Getúlio Dias



Vasconcelos

#### Jose Alencar Furtado

A lawyer, 54, and leader of the federal bench of the MDB, he was suspended in 1977. He wants the party to give the economy the attention it is devoting to institutional themes. Recently he and 82 opposition parliamentarians pledged to remain together after party reform. He will be a candidate for the post of governor of Parana in 1982.

### Jose Ibrahim

A metallurgist, 32, he was exiled in 1969 and returned three months ago. He admits that he is still "getting my bearings in the Brazilian situation." He believes the PT would be viable, but not yet. He believes that it is not worthwhile maintaining unity in the MDB "at any price." He therefore sides with those who want to purge the moderates from the party. He is of an age, training and disposition which could carry him far in politics.



**José Richa**



**Lysâneas Maciel**

### Jose Richa

A dentist, 44, he learned his politics in the old PDC [Christian Democratic Party], with Ney Braga as his master, and he continues still today to be a moderate. He was prefect of Londrina and was elected senator for Parana in 1978. If the situation remains the same, he will remain in the MDB. But as it will change, he is likely to shift to the PTB, to combat the left wing which controls the Parana opposition and to vie with Alencar Furtado for the state governorship in 1982.

### Leonel Brizola

An engineer, 57, he is returning to Brazil this Thursday. He must prove three things: to the right wing, that he will not set the country on fire; to the left wing, that he is not a tool of the regime; and to the public in general, that there is no solution to the conversion of society outside the PTB. He will be either in the Senate or in the history books by 1982. He wants to be president.

### Luís Inácio da Silva (Lula)

A metallurgist, 33, he is the best-known trade union leader in the country. He rejects the MDB, the PTB and the PCB and politicians in general. He is wagering everything on the PT, "the party of the wage-earners." But the left wing of the MDB believes that sooner or later he will agree to join with it under the same roof. He accounts for a million votes today.

### Luís Carlos Prestes

A military engineer, 81 years of age, he has been secretary general of the PCB since 1934. At the beginning of 1964, he said that the communists were

already in power. In exile in Moscow since 1970, he is returning with the intention of testing the ground for demanding legalization of the party. The supreme pontiff of Brazilian communism, he will keep the Communist Party faithful to its line, but in the event of an internal split, the faction which will stay with him is debatable.

#### Iysaneas Maciel

A lawyer who serves as counsel for political prisoners, he is 52 and a member of the Methodist Church. He was suspended in 1976 while serving his second term in federal office for the MDB of the state of Rio de Janeiro. He represents the World Council of Churches on the Human Rights Council of the UN. Last June, to the horror of his colleagues in the MDB left wing, he transferred his support to the PTB. He will be the left arm of Brizola in Rio de Janeiro.

#### Marcelo Cerqueira

A lawyer for the political prisoners, he is 35, and was elected a federal deputy for Rio de Janeiro in 1978 with the support of Chagas Freitas and the votes of the orthodox left. He promises to stand with the authentic faction in the opposition after the dissolution of the MDB, but the party game seems to concern him less than the "democratic question." This means that he may equally well remain where he is or switch to the PTB or PI.

#### Marcelo Gatto

An industrial chemist, 37 years old, he was a federal deputy and was suspended in 1976. He began in the old PDC, was elected by the workers' votes in the Santos lowlands, and according to the security organs, enjoyed the support of the PCB. He believes that the PTB divides while the MDB unites. He is returning to politics and will serve in the Congress again in 1982.



Conceição



Cerqueira

#### Marcelo Freire

A professor of law, 48, he is along with Paulo Brossard one of the most theatrical opposition senators. He is being weakened in politics in Pernambuco by Jarbas Vasconcelos. Affiliated with the authentic faction in the party, he will in any case stay with the MDB or the party which succeeds

its left-wing sector. His choices for 1982 are to continue in the Senate or to seek the governorship of Pernambuco.

#### **Maria de Conceicao Tavares**

A professor of economics, 49, she teaches in Campinas and in Rio de Janeiro. Endowed with singular training and a quick mind, she was the first scientist in her branch to note the weaknesses of the Brazilian model as early as 1971. This capability earned her a prison sentence. She plays a definite role among the economists who will help the left to understand the country better. She has the virtue of saying precisely what she thinks.

#### **Mario Covas**

An engineer, 49, he pursued his political career in the crowded Santos lowlands and won leadership of the federal bench of the MDB after being suspended in 1969. After 10 years in business, he returned to politics. He is a candidate for the presidency of the party in Sao Paulo. "The MDB has everything it needs to be the great popular party of Brazil," he believes. He will certainly win a seat in the Chamber of Deputies in 1982.



**Mário Covas**



**Mauro Borges**

#### **Mauro Borges Teixeira**

A military man, 58 years of age, he is the heir to the clan established by his father, Pedro Ludovico Teixeira, who died recently, to control the politics in Goias from 1930 on. Serving as governor in 1964, he supported the revolution but lost power in 1965. At the beginning of the year he joined the MDB and last week he announced his candidacy for the Senate in 1982. He should win. With the MDB extinct, the MDB in Goias will continue united.

#### **Miguel Arraes**

An economist, 62, he has returned after 15 years in exile in Algeria. Established in Pernambuco and a member of the MDB, he is a candidate for national commander of the left wing, which is polarized between him and Leopoldo Brizola. He needs to rediscover Brazil and to be rediscovered by the Brazilians under 35.



#### Orestes Quercia

A lawyer, 41, he established the party machinery in Sao Paulo which made him the senator winning the most votes in the history of the country in 1974. Since then, he has become the great falling star of the opposition. He wants to become governor of Sao Paulo in 1982 but, somewhat worn down, he does not know if he will continue with the MDB or join the PTB.

#### Paulo Brossard


A jurist, 54, and leader of the MDB in the Senate, he has an impeccably Rio Grande do Sul way of writing and speaking. An historic adversary of the laborites, he will remain as distant as possible from the PTB. Like Ulysses Guimarães, he tends to continue aligned with the radicals although he is not one of them. He would be welcome in the party of the moderates. In the 1974 elections, Brizola sent instructions to his party colleagues from Uruguay to support Brossard. In 1982, he may lose in the Senate if Brizola decides to dissociate himself from his candidacy.

#### Paulo Evaristo Arns

A cardinal and archbishop of Sao Paulo, 58, he is the Brazilian champion of the defense of human rights. In his view, the opposition, following amnesty, should turn to the wage problem and, later, to the convocation of a constituent assembly. From the government to the left wing, he will continue to have an attentive ear. Minister Delfim Neto regards him as one of the leading politicians of the country.



Pedro Simon



Ulysses



Raymundo Faoro



Dom Paulo

#### Pedro Simon

A lawyer, 48, he won a seat in the Senate because he lost the governorship of Rio Grande do Sul in 1978 because of the April packet. He can only fail to win the governorship in the next election if he does not want it, or if Brizola opposes him. The laborites already regard him as second only to the former governor in that state. In the broad left wing spectrum, he leans more toward Franco Montoro than Marcos Freire.

#### Raymundo Faoro

A lawyer, 54 years old, he helped to bury Institutional Act No 5 as president of the OAB [Brazilian Bar Association] and to revive habeas corpus for political crimes. He heads the periodical ISTO E and the JORNAL DA REPUBLICA, launched in Sao Paulo last week. He will be one of the main sources of ideas for the opposition. He will never be one of the masters of power, among other things because what he feels for them is an intellectual curiosity, profound skepticism and a certain contempt.

#### Renato Azeredo

A lawyer, 59 years of age and a federal deputy, he is the purest specimen of the PSD [Social Democratic Party] sector in Minas Gerais. He will leave the MDB in the first large contingent to shift to the party "which will include 'minister' Tancredo Neves." He wants to seek government office in Minas Gerais in 1982.

#### Roberto Saturnino

An economist, 47, he swears fidelity to the MDB, which elected him senator, but with the reservation that "obstacles should not be placed in the path of creating other parties." He dreams of a perfected opposition with a program capable of uniting the MDB, PTB and PT. Following party reform, he believes there is no future within an MDB (or its equivalent) dominated by the left wing. At such a time, Leonel Brizola might try to win him over. He will try for a Senate seat or the governorship of Rio in 1982.



Rômulo



Ronaldo Cabral



Tancredo Neves



Thales Ramalho

#### Rômulo de Almeida

An economist, 65, he is one of the fathers of PETROBRAS [Brazilian Petroleum Corporation]. He worked with Vargas and was a member of the PTB in the 1950s. He ran again in 1978 as candidate for the Senate for the MDB in Bahia. He lost and will not try his luck at the polls again. In any case he will continue to engage in "political pedagogy." He wants the MDB to survive, but says he "greatly values" Brizola.

### Ronildo Cabral Magalhaes

An oil industry worker, 39, he is one of the trade union leaders in Rio de Janeiro who is closest to Lula. As a metallurgist, he mistrusts the young leftists who want to move closer to the workers' class. Also, like Lula, he believes that the political future of that class lies with the PT.

### Severo Gomes

An industrialist, 55, he was a minister in the Geisel government until 1977. He joined the MDB after successive flirtations with the dissident ARENA [National Renewal Alliance] headed by Magalhaes Pinto and with the dissident militant group ventured by Gen Hugo Abreu. If the MDB survives, he will remain within it. Otherwise he will stay "with the same group I am in now," which means that headed by Fernando Henrique Cardoso. His stake is limited in any case by the fact that he has never won an elected post.

### Tancredo Neves

A lawyer, 59, he is the definitive proof of the immortality of the PSD, the central piece in the party system brain teaser. He is vying with Thales Ramalho of Pernambuco for the right to be the last to turn off the lights for the MDB. At the same time, he is competing with Magalhaes Pinto, also of Minas Gerais, for command of the party of the moderates. It is more likely that Tancredo will win federal office again than that Magalhaes will recover.

### Thales Ramalho

A lawyer, 56, he is the political protege of Marshal Oswaldo Cordeiro de Farias, and the most skillful manager of the large MDB household. As secretary general of the party, he has the records of the MDB in hand. If that party is eliminated, he will stay "where Dr Tancredo is." But he may also move toward the PTB in Pernambuco in order better to oppose Miguel Arraes and his leftist sector.

### Ulysses Guimaraes

A professor of law, 62, he has been a federal deputy since 1950. He is a politician of the purest PSD pedigree, and no one defends the survival of the MDB, of which he has been president for eight years, more adamantly than he. Whatever happens, he will wage a battle to keep the opposition united. "We cannot vie among ourselves until we have won for ourselves the state of law," he warns. If the MDB ceases to exist, he will remain in the MDB reborn under another name.

## BRAZIL

### FUTURE ROLE OF OPPOSITION ANALYZED

Sao Paulo VEJA in Portuguese 5 Sep 79 pp 28-29

[Text] With the multiplication of voices in the opposition resulting from the amnesty last week, it was inevitable that beginning this month the MDB [Brazilian Democratic Movement] would take on importance as a performer in the orchestra. The arrival of Leonel Brizola, Miguel Arraes and secondarily and later, Luis Carlos Prestes, has multiplied the notes in the opposition in a movement which it is increasingly difficult to harmonize. This division, which the MDB urged in its campaigns and then tried with all its strength to avoid in recent months, may be carried forward for some time. But already the strategists of Brizola's PTB [Brazilian Labor Party] hope that the resurrection of their party will begin precisely with the return of former governor of Pernambuco Arraes. As Deputy Thales Ramalho hammered home to Brizola in New York, the presence of Arraes will inevitably lead to the scattering of the MDB moderates from the opposition front which the former governor of Pernambuco would so much like to unite.

This is the first reason for the effort by Brizola, just prior to his return and throughout the whole return schedule, to stress the contrast with Arraes as much as possible. In all the interviews, he has taken the opportunity to criticize his former colleague in exile, and in general, he stresses the moderate tone in his own statements. Determined to attract Arraes' base in Pernambuco, he has already won over former Deputy Francisco Juliao. And last Thursday he won a precious victory: Doutel de Andrade, his equerry, secured Ivete Vargas' bases in the state and established the unified Pernambuco section of the PTB, culminating three months of discreet negotiation with a seven-line note, and the hope of having won the support of at least ten state deputies, which would make this the second most important bench in the Recife Assembly.

### Dead and Wounded

Curiously, the exiles of political importance are returning at a time when the MDB is counting the votes in the recent battle for the municipal conventions--the last before the current parties cease to exist. The results seem to give the moderate wing an advantage. But no preliminary results



can be conclusive. "Anyone who says he has an idea of who won is being flippant," warned the well-informed secretary general of the party, Thales Ramalho, who tried without success to obtain reports on the results from the almost 3800 MDB executive committees scattered throughout the country. Among the conflicting stories, the only one beyond challenge is the overwhelming triumph of Governor Chagas Freitas in Rio. In control of 24 out of the 25 executive committees in the capital, he extended his fief to control 80 percent of the regional officers. And he is persuaded that he can maintain his troops after the party reform. Although on the one hand he will lose the Brizola supporters, he may win ARENA [National Renewal Alliance] members on the other, basically maintaining the current party machine.

The governor of Rio de Janeiro, who maintains a good relationship with the communists, hopes to achieve an agreement with other authentic parliamentarians during the harvest of deals which will inevitably be struck following party reform. He believes that, needing reinforcements as it will after the creation of the PTB, the authentic faction of the MDB will welcome his support. It is for this reason that he has not sought retribution as yet following the effort made by Bahia Governor Antonio Carlos Magalhaes to envelop him in the ARENA net. Chagas Freitas will not be grist for the government mill so long as he has a more comfortable alternative.

The less conclusive Sao Paulo conventions led the chess game between the groups headed by Senators Montoro and Quercia to a stalemate. Considered individually, federal Deputy Alberto Goldman's group has ceased to be a satellite and has assumed command in the alliance with Quercia. Now it controls a quarter of the party delegates. On the other hand, the coalition nominally headed by sociologist Fernando Henrique Cardoso, grouping together authentic, radical and physiological faction members, is advancing. Cardoso is now supporting Montoro and controls about 15 percent of the delegates. However, although the Goldman-Quercia group has a slight advantage over its adversaries in the executive committees as a whole, the battle for control could tip the decision either way, depending on the decision of the 10 percent of the delegates without a clear preference.

#### The New Parties

The MDB in Sao Paulo wants to resolve this doubt by the drafting of a single slate. But it is possible that by October, the date of the state convention, the effort will prove in vain. The government is determined to establish its future majority, the so-called "Arenao," before sending the new law on the party organization to the Congress in the first week of October. This is a change in the original plan adopted by President Figueiredo on the recommendation of Governor Antonio Carlos Magalhaes, a defender of the concept that a majority party should be developed first and the multiple-party system adopted afterward.

In the view of the majority of those within the MDB, it is not in the Congress that the party will be eliminated. It is possible that some less experienced deputies believe in this concept. But the effort to preserve the party is at odds with the mobilization of the left wing and the laborites, which are now in public conflict. For those outside the MDB, its elimination is a virtue. Therefore the idea of a federation of opposition groups guided by common interests was bypassed on the initiative of the government. Following the amnesty, the distribution of the opposition forces changed definitively.

5157

CSO: 3001

## BRAZIL

### STRENGTH OF MDB IN VARIOUS STATES ANALYZED

Sao Paulo VEJA in Portuguese 12 Sep 79 pp 25-26

[Text] "A party is like a road," said engineer Leonel Brizola in a recent talk with a party colleague. "First, a rough path is cleared. Then come the road markers. Later the earth-moving crew does its work, and after that the asphalt is laid. Only then can people use the road." The PTB [Brazilian Labor Party] road already has some sections ready for use in the South. In Rio de Janeiro, the earth work of the leftist roadway is well advanced. Elsewhere in Brazil, the road markers are working as fast as they can. This then is the general situation of the project of this party which has already acquired national dimensions, but which still requires the support of seven more senators in order to be able to organize as the law requires.

#### Rio Grande do Sul

All 31 MDB state deputies went to Sao Borja to welcome Brizola. His return flight marked the beginning of the migration season for the opposition politicians of Rio Grande do Sul toward the PTB. At least 20, possibly as many as 25, of the state deputies are likely to end up in the former governor's party. The same is true of 13 of the 21 city councilmen in Porto Alegre (including 2 members of the ARENA [National Renewal Alliance]), and 11 of the 18 members of the Rio Grande do Sul MDB federal bench. There is nothing surprising here. After all, the MDB in Rio Grande do Sul was always the PTB with a different name.

The head of the opposition in the state, Senator Pedro Simon, is still reluctant to admit formally that he will go to the PTB, in which he began his political career in 1958. His hesitation will end when his MDB term of office concludes, perhaps as early as the October convention. The blending of the two currents in which the Rio Grande do Sul PTB has divided--the "historic" faction, whose left-wing views do not go beyond the letter testament of Vargas, and the "popular" faction, in whose view the new PTB should take on a clearly socialist aspect--will be the source of greater difficulty for the former governor.

## Rio de Janeiro

Even in the state in which the old PTB left an impression almost as deep as in Rio Grande do Sul, and where Brizola was elected a federal deputy in 1962 with the votes of a fourth of the electorate, the laborites cannot yet fully celebrate the festival of its resurrection. As in the rest of the country, many opposition parliamentarians in Rio de Janeiro are waiting and watching those who have already made a deal with the PTB, such as federal Deputies Jose Mauricio and J. G. de Araujo Jorge.

Brizola's hopes lie with Senator Roberto Saturnino, with whom the tireless Doutel de Andrade, the ambassador plenipotentiary of the PTB in Rio de Janeiro, is trying to carve out an alliance based on the senator's aspiration to be governor of the state. Brizola's main gain on the left is suspended federal Deputy Lysaneas Maciel, who broke with the MDB and would like to enrich the PTB with the radicals in the trade union and base community sectors. Maciel's indoctrination may lead to talks among the MDB church progressives. Federal Deputy Marcelo Cerqueira, of the party's left wing, defends the thesis of opposition unity "at least until 1980." He believes that Brizola "will help to unite the democratic forces," from which he excludes Governor Chagas Freitas. There will not even be agreement between Brizola and Chagas. Apart from their political differences, there is the important fact that, when the new party structure is built, the governor will go along with Senator Tancredo Neves in an independent party.

## Sao Paulo

Brizola is concentrating his most valuable chips in Sao Paulo on the space marked Andre Franco Montoro. Recently urged by Doutel de Andrade to join the PTB, Montoro responded with the suggestion that Brizola join the MDB as head of a "labor trend" within the party. Montoro will relay the suggestion directly to the former governor when he meets with him this week in Porto Alegre, although he knows that the answer will be negative.

In any case, closer relations between the two might lead to an arrangement whereby, even without moving to the PTB, Montoro would have the support of labor for his candidacy for the state governorship. In exchange, the senator would support the candidate nominated by the PTB when elections are held for the prefect of Sao Paulo. Last week, former President Janio Quadros made it clear that he might affiliate with the PTB if Brizola keeps his distance from the communists. Distant from the communists Brizola already is--as far away as Janio Quadros is from any palpable influence on national politics.

## Parana

"Parana is the least pro-Brizola state below Rio de Janeiro," says federal Deputy Alvaro Dias, the strongest candidate for the presidency of the MDB in Parana at the October convention. At least in terms of parliamentary



support, he is right. For of those in the Congress, only Senator Francisco Leite Chaves, lacking any leadership in the opposition in this state, has already gone over to the PTB. Federal Deputy Euclides Scalco, the head of the MDB in Parana, refused for months to talk with Brizola by overseas telephone line. Some days ago, when Brizola himself finally took the step of placing the call, Scalco remained cool. "Our goal, Governor, is the same, but our positions are different." Even so, the PTB could benefit from the dispute between the two factions in which the opposition in Parana is divided, one headed by Senator Jose Richa and the other by suspended federal Deputy Alencar Furtado, both potential candidates for the state governorship. The group which emerges the weaker in October will perhaps attempt to approach Brizola for purposes of survival.

#### Pernambuco

The great enemy of the PTB on the left is Miguel Arraes. But if he steers the MDB vessel too far to the left in the state, there will always be passengers who will disembark at the comparatively safer port where Brizola is located. The minister of agriculture under Joao Goulart, Oswaldo Lima Filho, whose father was one of the founders of the PSD [Social Democratic Party], is already there to welcome them, as Brizola's lieutenant. Of the seven federal deputies elected by the MDB in the state, Lima Filho has already succeeded in winning over to the PTB Sergio Murilo Santa Cruz, another descendant of the PSD dynasty. But the great dream of the PTB is to win the support of the present secretary general of the PTB, Deputy Thales Ramalho, who was also raised in the PSD cradle. His support would to some extent offset the rejection by former Governor Cid Sampaio, the veteran UDN [National Democratic Union] politician who rallied 325,000 votes in the last election for the Senate.

#### Minas Gerais

As in the past, the PTB continues to be a second-rate brand in Minas Gerais politics. Of the 18 MDB federal deputies, only two--the veteran Genival Tourinho and the beginner Carlos Costa--have thus far decided to support Brizola. A third parliamentarian, a product of the old labor sector, Joao Herculino, also supports the PTB, but that headed by Ivete Vargas. On Brizola's instructions, Tourinho has been trying to win over other leaders, such as former Deputy Edgar da Mata Machado, who has great prestige with the Catholic left, and Senator Itamar Franco, of the MDB, a probable candidate for the governorship of the state in 1982. Tancredo Neves, the first violin in the Minas Gerais PSD, talked with Brizola in New York, but it is more likely that the sea will reach Belo Horizonte than that he will join the PTB.

#### The Other States

Elsewhere the map of the PTB shows mainly vast desert areas. Brizola hopes to convert them into fertile land with his political irrigation projects.

Acre--For the time being, no sign of labor party life.

Amazonas--Former Governor Plínio Coelho supports Brizola, and former Governor Gilberto Mestrinho supports Ivete Vargas.

Para--Reorganizing the PTB is the task of former federal Deputy Ferro Costa.

Maranhao--The key to the PTB lies with former federal Deputy Neiva Moreira, in exile in Mexico.

Piauí--Former federal Deputy Chagas Rodrigues has already set to work.

Ceara--MDB Deputies Antonio Moraes and Haroldo Sanford will join the PTB.

Rio Grande do Norte--Former Governor Aluizio Alves would be most comfortable in the Independent Party. If there is none, he will join the PTB.

Paraíba--Brizola is soliciting Deputies Marcondes Gadelha of the MDB and Antonio Mariz, an ARENA dissident.

Alagoas--MDB Deputy Jose Costa and dissident ARENA Deputy Murilo Mendes have been won over.

Sergipe--No sign of labor party life.

Bahia--MDB federal Deputy Hilderico Oliveira has given his support to the PTB.

Espírito Santo--Weak signals.

Goiás--Some response from former Governor Mauro Borges expected.

Mato Grosso--Tenuous hopes. Former Minister of Health Wilson Fadul is doing what he can in the North and the South.

Santa Catarina--Former Deputy Doutel de Andrade will oversee the reorganization of the party from Rio.

5157

CSO: 3001

## BRAZIL

### CURRENT SHIFTS WITHIN MDB ANALYZED

#### Groups Vie for Control

Sao Paulo O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 5 Sep 79 p 3

[Text] Brasilia--The possibility that the MDB [Brazilian Democratic Movement] can remain united following party reform appears ever more precarious. Ulysses Guimaraes and leaders Paulo Brossard and Freitas Nobre had no alternative but to continue to refuse to agree to the elimination of the present party, but this was a government decision not recognized formally as such by President Joao Figueiredo for tactical reasons only, as much as it was a majority concern of the opposition itself. In this instance, ideology has been replacing federal political expediency, and the three factions into which the party is divided are today irreconcilable. Only a miracle resulting from the resurgence of the emergency revolutionary process, for example, could serve as an amalgam to unite them again, but the government appears determined not to provide this means of maneuvering.

Thus of a bench composed of 189 federal deputies, more than 90 support the establishment of an independent moderate bloc, capable, in their view, of maintaining a kind of "democratic opposition" dubbed by its adversaries as an "auxiliary line for the Planalto Palace." Nearly 40, or 50 at a maximum, make up the authentic-liberal nucleus, and a slightly smaller number (between 35 and 40) have already committed themselves to the labor sector of former Governor Leonel Brizola. The few remaining undecided will have made a choice within a few days, and it is worth stressing that another factor as important as ideology dividing them lies in the states' situations. They are all seeking space to assure reelection or new ventures in their careers, involving posts as senators, state governors and their substitutes.

The concept of promoting a broad opposition alliance, involving the participation of Leonel Brizola, Miguel Arraes and other exiles ready (is this the right word?) to return to the country, in addition to all the main leaders and officers of the MDB, was frustrated even before it was born.

However a reversal marks the week in progress in terms of the imminent dispersal from the party which is expected. Until a short time ago,

presuming that the moderates would depart to form an "independent party" with the dissident factions in the ARENA (National Renewal Alliance), and that the laborites would follow their own path, the authentic and the liberal factions were presumed to be the heirs of the party tradition, even if forced to convert from a "movement" to a "party." They would even maintain rather close ranks to help them in future elections. Suddenly, however, the moderates discovered that they had always been a majority in the party, and still are. Therefore they do not intend to depart, much less to be dubbed turncoats or "adesistas." To maintain what remains of the MDB, including the structures patiently built up in recent years. If the laborites take their leave, and if the liberal and authentic factions rebel against the moderate, majority force, let them also pursue their fate, founding a socialist or similar party, but leaving the banner in the hands of the moderates.

The national MDB convention, the culmination of the municipal conventions held last Sunday and the sequel to the regional conventions in October, is scheduled for 4 November, since the party did not agree to the desirability of approving a postponement this year. By that date, there is no doubt that the government will have already sent to the Congress a draft law on party reform, beginning with dissolution of the ARENA and the MDB, but it is not likely that it will have been approved. The schedule does not call for a vote on the reform until the second half of November, for passage on 5 December, which will mean that the deputies and senators will end their work this year as members of the MDB and the ARENA, but will begin their holiday without affiliation. They would have until March of next year for the final details of establishing the new parties or provisional groups--details which will depend on the law in effect at that time.

The moderates intend to provide an obvious demonstration of strength at this last party convention, electing a national board which, with small subsequent alterations to accommodate the dissidents from the ARENA, will constitute the leadership of the "independent party," even if it is called "national democratic." It is not unlikely that they will nominate Tancredo Neves as candidate for the presidency, and if Ulysses Guimaraes is still affiliated with the authentic faction, he will have to face his comrade in past struggles.

On the ARENA side, there is no less confusion, even leading leader Nelson Marchezan to admit that it would be difficult today to establish the "Arenao," a single party supporting the government. The resistance of the state groups which have been constantly excluded will increase in defense of the establishment of two parties to support the government, an "Arenao" (greater ARENA) and an "Areninha" (lesser Arena), despite the stand taken by Minister Petronio Portella, in whose view the guarantee of stability for the regime will rest with a single, large party.

A major MDB leader has said: "The schism has taken on such depth that not even if Miguel Arraes were to come to Recife dressed as the Pope and blessing all, could the moderates succeed in remaining in the party of their choice."

Not until next year will the government proceed with the return to direct gubernatorial elections, the official intention, almost a decision, but depending still on the development of events. A vote on the Edison Lobao amendment will not be allowed this year, although the ARENA politician from Maranhao still has hopes--more symbolic than reasonable, for if the outcome of direct elections is almost certain, why not effect it in one single stroke?

Out of the cornucopia of new ideas and reform proposals poured forth to the Congress for some time now, yet another emerged yesterday: once direct gubernatorial elections are reestablished, why not make the elections for prefects in the capitals direct also, but linked with the former? Each gubernatorial candidate before running for election would have to announce his choice of prefectural candidates for his capital, someone from the same party and approved by the convention. If elected, the prefect would enjoy an equal mandate, and could not be dismissed by a personal act of the governor. This concept would serve to accomodate regional situations and would create space for the minority trends in each party.

#### Liberals, Guimaraes Clash

Sao Paulo O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 6 Sep 79 p 3

[Text] Rio de Janeiro--The liberal wing of the MDB, which does not want to go along with the moderates or to join a new party, but which is maintaining its field of action occupied by the leftists and members of the "authentic" faction, has decided to demand new definitions and positions of Ulysses Guimaraes, having reached the conclusion that MDB unity can only be maintained if the party is prepared to define itself, even if this means some losses from its ranks.

The liberal faction in the opposition believes it essential that Ulysses Guimaraes state publicly what the MDB really is, i.e. that he establish the basic guidelines of the party again, and on this basis, disciplining the authentic and moderate factions. In other words, those who do not want to follow the party guidelines should leave and seek their fate elsewhere.

And it was on the basis of such thinking that two documents were drafted as outlines for future pronouncements by Ulysses Guimaraes. The first merely analyzes the problems of party policy in the country, reasserting the position of the MDB and announcing the expulsion from its ranks of the most notorious "adesistas," such as Chagas Freitas and his followers in Rio, and Maluf and his followers in Sao Paulo. The second analyzes the economic policy of the government in terms of the new reality, the rise of Delfim Netto.

However Ulysses Guimaraes continues to resist. He believes that the current situation does not allow definition and that no stand can be adopted until the return of Leonel Brizola and Miguel Arraes can be duly analyzed and



weighed. Any precipitate action now, in his view, would merely mean hastening an irreversible party schism.

And consistent with such thinking, he is also unwilling to take any steps to expel the Chagas and Maluf factions from the MDB. Ulysses Guimaraes has even gone so far as to say to one of the liberals that he is not in a position to "lose any moderate or adesista," on pain of turning over party control once and for all to the left. He believes that for the time being it is necessary to avoid providing any pretext for those who are merely awaiting an opportunity to withdraw from the MDB.

Ulysses Guimaraes is correct in that currently there is no one sufficiently well informed as to what the government intends, because the party reorganization would really be much more nearly a general staff plan than a plan for political action. Based on this reasoning, Minister Petronio Portella himself not only does not know what will happen, but also his action will be rather limited, being surprised again by a "package" which will shortly be presented to the nation.

However the statements made by Ulysses Guimaraes have not only frustrated but also angered the deputies and senators who regard themselves as members of the liberal wing of the party, and who do not want to join Brizola's PTB [Brazilian Labor Party], but do not want to convert the present MDB into the "party of Arraes" either.

According to them, the party must expel the adesistas in order to gain the moral authority to face up to the most vociferous radical minorities, which can only be done after clearer definitions of the new goals and greater readiness to confront the left. In the view of the liberals, the party has suddenly ceased to oppose the government--Simonsen's departure was better utilized by the government party than the MDB--and has begun to concern itself with problems of much greater interest to the elite than the people such as, for example, party reform, which is receiving much more attention than the wage policy of the nation, a banner which was in the end taken over by Delfin Netto.

They further note that the most active left-wing sectors have in fact made the activities of the opposition more difficult, as occurred with the vote on the amnesty proposal. The Djalma Marinho amendment, they believe, failed to win approval solely because the leftists decided to take a more radical stand, first of all, refusing to negotiate with regard to it, and then launching into verbal attacks on the ARENA. "We would have had," one MDB member said, "30 dissident ARENA votes, but on the day the vote was taken there were so many speeches attacking them that we ended up with only 13. And those in prison remain there because there were many people more interested in making noise than in achieving their release."

But Ulysses Guimaraes' policy of temporizing and his refusal to redefine the party continue to irritate the liberals and there are even those who

are calling the president of the opposition party "our great World War I marshal."

"Ulysses was great in the era of resistance, and he was perfect in trench warfare. But now, during the blitzkrieg, when the movement is at war, he no longer knows how to act."

Thales Ramalho, the secretary general of the MDB, is even expected to join Brizola's PTB, while Jose Aparecido, the main spokesman for Deputy Magalhaes Pinto, still nurtures the hope of joining him in the future independent party, if one such can truly exist.

Thales Ramalho has already informed Ulysses Guimaraes that he cannot remain in the same party with Miguel Arraes, or he would be putting an end to his political career in Pernambuco. For one of those reasons which only occur in Brazilian politics and which disorient the "Brazilianists" who appear here, Thales is one of those who believes that Brizola is the man today on which the United States relies.

#### Old Ideas

The Engineering Club has announced the conclusions reached by the First Brazilian Congress on Coal and other domestic fuels. They call for drilling in search of oil in the Campos region and discuss the capacity of the carboniferous basins in the southern states, pointing to alcohol as a fuel option.

These conclusions, released this month during the club's electoral campaign, were made public on 22 October 1922. As can be seen, theories have been discussed in Brazil for 57 years. Discussed, and no more.

5157

CSO: 3001

## BRAZIL

### MDB HOPES BRIZOLA COULD UNITE OPPOSITION FORCES

Sao Paulo O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 9 Sep 79 p 3

[Text] Brasilia--In the past few hours, a new possibility has developed that the opposition, even though divided into three main groups and ready to split into three future parties, could establish a broad front capable of dealing with the government and acting consistently when it comes to the main problems of the country. On Thursday, when the first statement by Leonel Brizola as soon as he landed on Brazilian territory were made known, this possibility dropped to the lowest point, since the former governor, perhaps carried away by the emotions of his return, failed to measure his words and accused the MDB [Brazilian Democratic Movement] of lack of realism and of no longer existing as a party, "having already completed its role." A number of MDB leaders reacted, including Deputy Fernando Lyra, who stressed that Brizola has forgotten that the realists were the men who fought here within the country for his reintegration in political life, forcing the process of institutional detente and amnesty itself forward. The realists were those who, suspended or having lost their political rights, did not put aside their weapons in the past 15 years but continued to face emergency and arbitrary measures.

On Friday, however, reformulating the ideas set forth in the heat of his return, Brizola praised the MDB, recognized its preponderant role in the real situation, past, present and future, and paved the way for an understanding. Even though determined to organize the PTB [Brazilian Labor Party], he seems ready to agree to a broad front.

Senator Marcos Freire will go today to Porto Alegre, representing the leadership of the MDB and as one of the leaders of the authentic group, in a desire to utilize the opportunity, after successive meetings held last weekend with his colleagues in Brasilia. He will take a copy of the document released Thursday by the MDB senators' bench, which may serve as a basis for the rallying of the factions into which the opposition is divided. Even if they function in separate parties, their members will be in a position to begin to draft a minimal program of action, for the text in question does not lay claim to being definitive or to setting forth final truths on the political, social or economic levels. It represents a point of departure, an agenda,

which the former governor of Rio Grande do Sul will be asked to consider, modify, add to and enrich. The same will be done with the moderates in the MDB, for one of their leaders, Senator Tancredo Neves, did not hesitate to endorse it four days ago.

For Leonel Brizola in particular, an opportunity is provided for him to reverse the impression that he is, even if unwittingly, playing the game of the government and contributing to causing the opposition to implode, such that the strategy of the Planalto Palace can be frustrated if the broad front manages to get off the ground. The dissolution of the present parties is a decision already adopted by the government political command, and is even desired by vast contingents of the opposition, including moderates, laborites and the authentic faction itself. What the defenders of unity urge, however, as a last maneuver to prevent a general collapse in internal dispute, is the importance of a broad front as a common denominator which will permit them, after the parties are dissolved, to pursue uniform guidelines in parliamentary action, diverging on details and acting autonomously, but joining together on major matters.

Will the supporters of this greater unity win success through Marcos Freire's mission in Porto Alegre? It seems too soon to say, since thus far they have failed, but if good sense prevails overall, in a kind of holy spirit descending from the skies late but still in time, who knows?

Leonel Brizola was even being dubbed a "cross-eyed vampire" in the service of the government, sucking the blood of his own colleagues until late in the day on Friday, and before the terms of his second interview in Sao Borja were known, but within a few hours this impression had receded or at least come to a halt. The next step will be for him to take, after talking with Marcos Freire, and the statement he will make in Porto Alegre on Tuesday or Wednesday is anxiously awaited. Even if he maintains the thesis that the labor movement needs to be organized immediately, he will have room to urge broad unity of the opposition factions and even to participate in its development, because he has a reasonable relationship for dialog with the moderates, beginning with Tancredo Neves.

Thus the three parties into which the MDB will divide--the so-called independent party, and two moderate parties, the labor group and what remains of the old party, which will probably be known as the PDB [Brazilian Democratic Party]--could form a group for action unlikely to yield to the siren song of the government, at least on major questions, to be established sometime next year. The confusion is still great, it should be reiterated, and there are those interested for personal reasons in subverting the undertaking in all three sectors, but the main argument which might lead them to failure is based on their own survival. The fact is that the electoral base, despite the ventures of the Planalto Palace and the increasing popularity of President Joao Figueiredo, continue to support the opposition. The voters will know how to respond, when the time comes when they can express themselves freely and directly, to those who contributed to schism.

A certain concern affects the ARENA [National Renewal Alliance] benches, especially that in the Senate, with regard to the successive waves of reports, documents and secret materials pertaining to the nuclear agreement between Brazil and Germany. Who could be leaking texts which until a short time ago were super-secret and inaccessible to both government and opposition party parliamentarians, as well as the press? Obviously not the Brazilian government! The Germans? No, again. In the manner of Sherlock Holmes, it would be well, without going into the merit of the agreements, whether they are just or unjust, beneficial or harmful to national security, to ask who profits from the crime? Elementary, my dear Watson.

The minister of debureaucratization, Helio Beltrao, has indicated satisfaction with the results achieved by the announcement of the first concrete steps taken to benefit national life from the bureaucratic point of view. He said yesterday that what has been announced accounts for not even five percent of what will happen by the end of the year. By means of decrees and draft laws, he will embark firmly on adaptation of the tax system and a strategy designed to facilitate the activities of small and average enterprises, which are immobilized now in the grip of bureaucracy. Out of 1,800,000 national enterprises, for example, at least half involve businesses with an owner and one or more employees, and for them, nor even for the others, there is no justification for the whole paraphernalia beginning with the trade councils and ending God knows where, threatening their operations and affecting the country's economy adversely. President Joao Figueiredo has given Beltrao full support and wants this, among others, to be one of the main goals achieved by the government: facilitating national life.

5157

CSO: 3001

END



**END OF**

**FICHE**

**DATE FILMED**

Oct-31-79

JL